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Introduction 
The end of Cold War has been characterized by the increasing intrastate conflict around the 
world with Africa accounting for a large number of these conflicts. When the quest for 
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ideological influence was brought to an end after the fall of the Berlin wall, Africa became of 
less strategic importance to the West. The long standing issues which had been delayed by the 
Cold War became the cause of conflicts in various parts of Africa. The fall of communism meant 
that democracy was becoming widely acceptable as a system of governance. This system allows 
citizens to elect their leaders through free and fair elections, and these are used to measure the 
extent of maturity of democracy in a particular country. However, not all elections have been a 
practice for power transition in all regions. Elections have been used as an instrument to ignite 
conflicts. Zimbabwe was not immune to this; elections in this country have at different times 
resulted in state-sponsored violence. In principle, Zimbabwe was founded on the principle of 
multiparty politics as articulated in the Lancaster Agreement.   However, President Robert 
Mugabe has enjoyed more than two decades of unbroken power. The policies he adopted to 
secure his rule, such as constitutional amendments and the, invasion of commercial farms 
where farmers were not willing to give up their farms without compensation, have resulted in 
economic hardship. This combined with a crumbling health infrastructure as well as social 
instability has led to political instability. By all accounts President Mugabe and his party, the 
Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU PF), were responsible for the civic mobilization and 
the emergence of the opposition party the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). The 
situation in Zimbabwe was exacerbated by the political intolerance of the ruling party towards 
the opposition. The extenuating circumstances, under which the people of Zimbabwe had to 
live, attracted the attention of international as well as regional actors to intervene to prevent 
Zimbabwe from slipping into anarchy. 
 
The main actors in Zimbabwe’s political arena are the MDC and the ZANU-PF. The two parties 
ceased to see each other as political opponents competing over people’s votes but saw each 
other as enemies. These circumstances made it impossible for dialogue to take place between 
the parties involved. There was a total lack of communication between the two parties which 
necessitated the presence of a third party to create a platform for reconciliation. It was due to 
this incapacity that different actors became interested in playing this role without achieving 
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notable success. South Africa had been pressured to intervene due to its role as a strategic 
player in the region. The former South African President, Thabo Mbeki, was even criticized for 
his limited intervention in Zimbabwe which was labeled as “quiet diplomacy”. South African 
government intervened in Zimbabwe, both at state and party level, long before the conflict 
attracted international media attention. The role of South Africa in Zimbabwe will be examined 
later in this thesis. It was only in 2007 that the Southern African Development Community 
(SADC) assumed the role of mediator to the conflict in Zimbabwe under the facilitation of 
Thabo Mbeki. After eight years of stalemate, crumbling economy, expulsion from the 
Commonwealth, and sanctions by the United States and the European Union, the conflict in 
Zimbabwe transformed itself to allow negotiations to take place. Negotiations were opened in 
July 2008 between the ruling party, ZANU -PF and the two factions of the MDC, MDC-Tsvangirai 
and MDC led by Mutambara.. This followed the Presidential run-off elections in 2008, where 
Mugabe was the sole candidate, after the MDC leader, Morgan Tsvangirai, pulled out at the last 
minute due the state-sponsored violence against his supporters. 
 
 However, the big question is what was behind the breakthrough? This thesis focuses on the 
diplomatic intervention and, the extent to which it had impetus to break the impasse in the 
Zimbabwe conflict. It explores the impact that mediation, as a form of peace diplomacy, had in 
bringing about a resolution to the long standing conflict. It takes into account the fact that 
mediation competes with other forms of intervention such as military intervention, economic 
and political sanctions, and so forth. Literature on mediation has recently acknowledged the 
entry point as an essential part of mediation. “There is little doubt that the preferred mode of 
entry is one where all the parties involved in a dispute approach a particular agency or person 
to assist them.”1 Maundi2 asserts that, more often than not, scholars of conflict resolution have 
concentrated on roundtable negotiation when discussing mediation, leaving out entry point. He 
is of the view that without due regard to the entry point of the mediators, one will not be able 
                                                          
1
 Anstey, M, Practical Peace-making: A Mediator’s Handbook, Juta&Co, Ltd, Cape Town, 1993,p55 
2
 Maundi,M, Zartman,I, Khadiagala,G,Nuamah,K, Getting in: Mediators’ Entry into the settlement of African Conflicts,  Washington D.C, USIP 
Press, 2006, p3 
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to give full analysis of the subject3. Quoting John Stedman, he emphasizes that “mediators need 
to know the conditions that facilitate negotiation, the barriers that negotiations face, and how 
these barriers can be overcome effectively”4. Khadiagala5 asserts that a process of searching for 
a mediator begins prior to negotiations. It is usually not an easy task to find a mediator who is 
acceptable to both parties to a conflict. In most cases, governments are reluctant to accepting 
third-party intervention because it weakens their positions. It portrays them as incapable of 
managing their own affairs. Such a case was Kenya whereby “the entry of mediators was 
complicated by a legacy of national pride that had accumulated in the years of years of relative 
political stability”6. Usually the party (s) that is in opposition to the government is most likely to 
accept mediators because they are the most to gain in such a situation.  For a mediator to be 
accepted by all parties, he/she needs to have their trust and confidence. Especially, if the 
would-be mediator has close ties with the government or is perceived to be closely aligned to 
one or other party involved in the mediation, the concerned party may feel that, he/she is likely 
to push for a solution favourable to the government. The impartiality of a mediator will be 
discussed as one of the factors to be considered when parties accept mediation. It is important 
to note that the definition of mediation is sensitive to sovereignty, a right protected by the 
Treaty of Westphalia. Even the United Nations, which is widely accepted as an international 
body that governs states, protects this right and prevents its members from interfering in the 
internal affairs of a state.     
Some scholars have argued that for mediation to take place, the parties with diverging views 
must reach a point at which reaching an agreement depends on them contribution equally to 
the mediation process. At this time, each party to the mediation sees itself as having power 
over the other. Zartman states that ‘negotiation takes place when stalemates occur, when a 
decision is impossible by other means, and when the parties have equal stalemating power; and 
negotiation is a joint decision-making process in which both parties are necessary to the 
                                                          
3 Ibid 
4 Ibid 
5 Khadiagala, G, “ Forty Days and Forty Nights of peacemaking in Kenya”, Journal of African Elections: Special Issue: Kenya, EISA, Johannesburg, 
2008,p8 
6 Zartman and Touval (1985),  International Mediation in Theory and Practice  ,Boulder, CO,  Westview Press, p9 
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decision or, otherwise stated, in which each party has a veto power’7. Very often in recent 
history of negotiation, adversaries find it hard to come to the table without expecting their will 
to prevail. This has increased the need to have a third party mediating or/and facilitating the 
whole process. Third parties are not always independent and impartial bodies, they have to 
possess certain features accompanying their role. This thesis argues that mediation is an 
instrumental tool for peace diplomacy. This study will be looking at the role of mediation in 
bringing about the resolution of conflict. It argues that without capacity, competence, influence 
and credibility of a mediator, the mediation is likely to not succeed. Thus, it will discuss the 
conditions and factors that made the SADC intervention successful.  
The school of conflict resolution presents different theories as to what brings about peaceful 
resolutions to conflict. However, scholars of conflict resolution assert that negotiation is not as 
challenging as pre-negotiation. During this period, the mediator requires certain skills to 
convince adversaries that they need to come to the table to resolve issues. Once the process of 
searching for and accepting mediation is concluded, the real task begins. The mediator is now 
faced with the task of facilitating communication between the disputing parties. This is often 
the hardest part of mediation. One cannot help inferring that a mediator needs to possess 
certain attributes in order to be able to succeed. Saunders notes that “persuading parties to a 
conflict to commit to a negotiated settlement is even more complicated, time-consuming, and 
more difficult than reaching agreement once negotiations have begun”8. It is at this stage 
where adversaries still believe that their interests should prevail in the negotiations before they 
can take the whole process seriously. In the present case, the Mbeki-led SADC mediation was 
faced with this problem of getting ZANU PF and the two factions of MDC to commit to the 
negotiations.  One of the main problems faced by the mediator was the hardline positions 
taken by both parties, each claiming legitimacy of leadership of Zimbabwe. They were both 
arguing that the negotiation should be based on their status as the democratically elected 
government of the country, from the two elections that took place in 2008.  This research will 
be exploring this process, and provide an understanding as to what leverage the mediator 
                                                          
7
 Zartman,IW, “The Negotiation process”, SAGE, London,1977 
8 Saunders,H, “We need A Larger theory of negotiation: the importance of pre-negotiation phases”, Negotiation Journal,Vol.1,1985,p23 
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enjoyed in this conflict. It will be looking at the obstacles which the mediator had to overcome 
to get the parties to the negotiating table. It argues that ‘whatever the substance of efforts to 
break the impasse, progress toward negotiation requires working with the politics of decision 
making on each side’.   
Rationale 
Noting with appreciation the effort that the African leaders have made in dealing with 
intrastate conflict through mediation, this thesis emphasizes the need for third-party 
intervention in African conflicts. The role of the SADC mediators in Zimbabwe resulted in a 
power sharing deal that was signed by the leaders of the opposition and the ruling party. It 
brought to an end the conflict evoked by the March 28 as well as the June 29, 2008 elections. A 
government of national unity was formed through this deal. However, the Zimbabwe story has 
not been given enough attention as to what influenced the deal. The media, and the western 
media in particular, have continued to report on the developments of the Zimbabwe conflict 
since its early stages. Violence has been the prominent feature in the Zimbabwe politics. 
Journalists have also reported on how President Mugabe and ZANU-PF have manipulated 
security and police organs of the state to achieve their own political ends. However, the story 
has been one-sided, and as in all conflict situations, there is always more than one side to the 
conflict. The issue of violence will be discussed later in this thesis. 
 It should be noted that the parties who presented diverging views and who were staunch 
adversaries before, managed to reach an agreement that binds them to work together to help 
rebuild Zimbabwe. A lot has been said about Zimbabwe and the mediation process; however, 
there is a lack of analysis as to what was behind the deal. In my analysis of the mediation, I have 
not overlooked the most essential aspects of mediation as laid out by Stedman, “that mediators 
need to know the conditions that facilitate negotiation, the barriers that negotiations face, and 
how these barriers can be overcome effectively”9. It is only after contextualizing these 
challenges in the Zimbabwe situation, that one can measure the success of the mediation. It is 
                                                          
9 Stedman, Stephen, “Negotiation and mediation in Internal conflict” Lynner Reinner 
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important to note that negotiations begin way before roundtable negotiation itself. The 
mediator consults with disputants to remove obstacles to negotiations before beginning the 
task of moving towards a negotiated settlement. Saunders discusses five factors that he 
identifies as obstacles to negotiations namely: “defining the problem; producing a commitment 
to a negotiated settlement; arranging a negotiation; the negotiation, and implementation10.  
This thesis investigates the process of mediation from the pre-negotiation phase to conflict 
resolution as a result of a settlement reached. It will examine the extent to which the mediators 
are accountable, and the influence they have over the parties. It is important to understand the 
impediments that the mediators are faced with during the negotiations in order to understand 
their role. This research takes into account that the nature of negotiations is that they are held 
behind closed doors. By so doing, there is the risk that citizens will feel “robbed of democracy” 
and feel that there is a lack of accountability and transparency as the process is perceived. Civil 
society expressed concerns about the secrecy of the Zimbabwe negotiations.  This is in contrast 
to the Kenyan negotiations, in which mediators ensured that the interests of all Kenyans were 
taken into account ‘through a wide consultative process with multiple constituencies’11 during 
the pre-negotiation phase.  
This thesis seeks to apply international theories of mediation and to give a better analysis of the 
Zimbabwe conflict. It will take into account the fact that attributes agreed to by different 
scholars of intrastate conflict mediation also depend on the circumstances of each case. The 
examination of the Zimbabwe conflict will determine the extent to which these theories fit the 
case. By so doing it aims to contribute to the growing literature on mediating African conflicts. 
The power-sharing deal in Kenya has set a precedent in Africa whereby conflict stemming from 
elections has led to and could continue to produce power-sharing compromises. It is the 
intention of this thesis to examine the benefits and dangers of this conflict resolution trend. As 
much as there has quite extensive literature on mediation, an African perspective of intrastate 
conflict mediation is lacking. Thus, this research will try and reverse this deficiency.   
                                                          
10Saunders, OpCit, p 
11 Khadiagala, G, OpCit, p15 
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Limitation and Scope of Study 
Negotiation is a complex process. It varies from the choice of the mediators, their acceptance, 
and the series of negotiations. This study will be focus on the role of the SADC mediators in the 
Zimbabwe negotiation process that started in July 2008, after the contested elections. 
Negotiation raises a lot of questions such as: who invites the mediators and when should the 
mediation commence? What influences their decision to accept the mediating role? A 
discussion of SADC’s first formal intervention in Zimbabwe to facilitate negotiations between 
the disputants is included in this thesis. Since 2001, there were a number of unsuccessful 
interventions by different bodies. An interrogation will be conducted to give an understanding 
of what led to their failure. With an understanding that negotiation takes place behind closed 
doors, this thesis will look at how the Zimbabwe mediation was conducted and the impact that 
the local environment had on the whole process. Due regard will be paid to developments that 
took place during the negotiations and their impact on the whole process. It takes into account 
that peace diplomacy, more often than not, competes with other kinds of interventions. 
However, it will focus on mediation as an essential tool for conflict resolution. Noting the 
complexity of the Zimbabwe story, this study will be limited to diplomatic interventions and 
more specifically, the SADC intervention since 2007. Theories of conflict resolution that will be 
used to explain the outcome will be selected from those that deal with entry point, to pre-
negotiation phase and reaching the outcome.  The following questions will guide this research: 
1. What are the conditions and factors necessary for a successful mediation? 
2. What factors do mediators have to take into account during the negotiation process? 
3. What are the constraints in mediating African conflicts?  
4. What are the characteristics of a good mediator with a potential for success? 
5. Why do adversaries accept some mediators and not others? 
 
Theoretical Framework 
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Over the past century, the concept of negotiation advanced with the growing need for states to 
work together. International relations have moved from imperialism through territorial wars to 
multilateralism. The emergence of international as well regional organizations proves that 
states have become more dependent on one another. States are now supporting peace world 
peace through international treaties that they sign and ratify. The change in the dynamics of 
conflict, from interstate to intrastate conflict, necessitates more engagement in the process of 
mediation to help bring peace in the internal affairs of a state. Negotiation has been the widely 
accepted mode of conflict resolution. Mediation is a form of third-party intervention into 
disputes, directed at assisting parties to find their own mutual acceptable settlement12.  In the 
case of intrastate conflict, it is usually between government officials and the representatives of 
the opposition or rebel groups. Negotiation is a form of diplomacy required in conflict 
resolution, but it needs other forms of diplomacy to succeed. This research will explore other 
forms of diplomacy or other steps in the mediation process. 
 A notable scholar of negotiation, Zartman13, asserts that parties need to reach a hurting 
stalemate before they can consider the art of negotiation as a process to find a solution. He 
speaks of translation of zero-sum mentality to positive mentality14. This theory suggests that 
adversaries have to realize that a solution can no longer be achieved individually and that they 
have to work towards a common solution. When the parties realize that they need each other 
to find a solution, and that they have to soften their position to allow reciprocity of 
concessions, they are said to be moving from zero-sum to positive mentalities. Negotiation is a 
complex process that, more often than not, requires an intervention by an independent third-
party. Parties need to be desperate to invite a mediator, as it was pointed out earlier that. It 
affects the country’s sovereignty. Sometimes mediators are not invited by the parties 
concerned, but the leverage they have, such as close proximity in the conflict gives them 
authority. There are lots of factors that need to be considered before inviting a mediator. 
                                                          
12 Anstey, M,OpCit, p1 
13 Zartman, IW, OpCit, p 
14 Zartman, 
15 
 
Scholars of negotiation suggest that the impartiality of a mediator is an important factor to be 
considered when identifying a mediator. 
 
Saadia Touval raises two vital questions about mediation namely: why does a mediator choose 
to mediate? Why do adversaries accept the mediation?15 Both these questions are essential for 
the analysis of pre-negotiation phase. There is a growing consensus among scholars that third 
parties mediate because they have a certain interests to protect.  Mitchel16 observes that the 
“neighbor mediator, normally a government or regional organization, seek to preserve regional 
stability by preventing the effects of the conflict spreading to neighboring countries”17. He 
further observes that “neighboring countries exhibit clear and realistic understanding of the 
tendency of major and long-lasting conflicts to draw in other governments, so that rapid 
settlement of the dispute is seen as a way of preventing the internationalization of regional 
disputes”.18 This view resonates well in the Zimbabwe context in that the Mbeki-led mediation 
had interests to protect. For SADC as a bloc, it had to prove the authority and effectiveness of 
the organization, based on the principle of ‘African solutions for African problems’. This 
organization enjoyed proximity and legitimacy because Zimbabwe is within its jurisdiction and is 
a member. Its legitimacy came from the SADC principles enshrined in the organization’s 
constitution. South Africa was faced with the spill-over effects of the conflict in Zimbabwe. As a 
pioneer of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), South Africa had to assume 
such a role to prove that it did not support poor governance, although the timing of the 
intervention is questionable. 
Mediators as impartial third parties 
Scholars of conflict resolution have observed that in a conflict, not everyone who intervenes is 
impartial. More often than not, mediators intervene because they have a certain interest to 
                                                          
15 Touval, S, 1993, “Gaining Entry to Mediation In Communal Strife”, In The Internationalization of Communal Strife ed. M. I. Midlarsky. London 
& New York: Routledge. 
16 Mitchel, CR, “The Motive for Mediation” in New Approaches To International Mediation, Greenwood Press, 1988, p13 
17 Ibid,p39 
18 Ibid,p40 
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protect, as indicated above. Thus, ‘the traditional view of mediators as impartial third parties 
has long been recognised as an inadequate characterization in situations where third parties 
have interests and the power to influence outcomes’19 .When interveners seeking to advance 
their interests through bargaining are said to have possessed bargaining power. There are those 
who try and impose their solution onto the parties through coercion. In order to have a better 
understanding of an intervener’s interest, this chapter has followed the work of Watkins and 
Winters20  who have distinguished between two types of interventions namely: transactional 
and embedded. Transactional refers to interveners with no prior relations with the parties in 
adversity; their intervention is based on a ‘once off’ basis. While the latter is usually affected by 
the conflict and they tend to be biased towards the outcome. The reason for their intervention 
is said to be based on the view that mediation will minimize the cost of continued conflict.21  
They observe that when interveners are biased in the sense of seeking to protect their interests 
by preventing spill-over effects, that they are thereby seeking to achieve a resolution more 
favourable to their allies, they are embedded22. The choice of South Africa’s former President 
Mbeki as a mediator was viewed as controversial by some. An official23 at the Economic 
Community of West African States argued that he (Mbeki) had too much respect for President 
Mugabe and that Mugabe took him as a son as Mugabe and Mbeki’s father, Govan Mbeki, were 
from the same generation of the struggle. He added that the “efficacy of a sitting head of state 
presents a conflict of interest between their duties as heads of states and as mediators”24. He 
argued that, because of his position as a head of state, he was not able to be firm against 
another head of state, and this therefore compromised his neutrality. 
The role of embedded interveners does not end with reaching an agreement or a resolution. 
Even after the agreement has been reached, these interveners continue to engage with the 
parties to assist with the implementation of what was agreed upon. This was a problem in the 
SADC mediation when Mbeki was ousted by his ruling party in his country and lost his position 
                                                          
19 Zartman and Touval, OpCit, p253  
20 Watkins and Winters, “In Theory: Intervenors with Interests and Power”, Negotiation Journal,Vol.13,No.2, April 1997 
21 Ibid, p121 
22 Ibid 
23 In interview in Johannesburg, South Africa, 19 November, 2008 
24 Ibid 
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as a president. His role as a mediator was questionable now that there was a new president 
who also chaired SADC. Due to the rise of issues in the implementation and interpretation of 
the power-sharing deal, the mediator had to go back and give clarity on the clauses of the 
document. Watkins and Winters assert “it is difficult to avoid remaining involved as interim 
agreements give rise to the need for ongoing enforcement and new issues become the focal 
point for the ongoing struggle between the contending parties”25. This holds for Zimbabwe, 
with the parties conflicting over how ministries should be shared between the ruling party and 
the two factions of the MDC. 
 Literature suggests that mediators need to possess certain power in order to advance their 
influence over the contending parties, namely facilitative, bargaining and coercive power. “They 
are facilitative if they can influence disputants because of their status, legitimacy, process 
management skills and interpersonal persuasiveness; bargaining if they offer parties incentives; 
and coercive if they possess ability to impose and enforce terms of the settlement 
unilaterally”26. However, the classical roles of mediators do not hold in recent history of 
mediation due to overlapping of roles. Watkins and Winters are of the view that interveners 
will first use facilitative powers to achieve settlement. If this fails, they consider bargaining and 
then finally resort to coercive power27. The rationale is that conflict evolves and different 
stakeholders may be involved. Thus, the need for a more effective mechanism arises at 
different stages of the conflict.  
Accepting mediators 
There is general consensus among scholars that mediation must be accepted by the contending 
parties in order for the outcome they help produce to be accepted. Research suggests that 
“contending parties’ perceptions of interveners’ interests and power have an impact on the 
functions third parties can perform in disputes”28. For the purpose of this research, this chapter 
will look at the role of a mediator with facilitative power, due to the belief that SADC enjoyed 
                                                          
25 Watkins and Winters, OpCit, p123 
26 Ibid 
27 Ibid 
28 Watkins and Winters, OpCit p124 
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such power in Zimbabwe. The functions of a mediator with facilitative power are as follows: 
“enhancing and shaping communications among disputants; persuading the parties to make 
concessions; enabling the parties to save face by coordinating mutual concessions absorbing 
anger or blame; and serving as a witness to agreement”. Disputants tend to favour mediators 
that possess bargaining power because they can compensate their concessions. This is usually 
the case where parties feel pressure from the people they represent. Carrots used by the 
mediator are used to justify the concessions they (the parties) make. Disputants often view 
concession as an epitome of surrender. Bargaining helps the mediator to move the disputants 
from this mentality. The nature of mediation is based on the mediator’s ability to assist 
disputants reach a resolution which they are unable to achieve on their own. Watkins and 
Winters’ evaluation of the Gulf War provides evidence that “disputants tend to view settlement 
as illegitimate and feel free to violate its terms unless there are credible threats are used to 
enforce them”29. During the negotiation, commitment is not always guaranteed from the 
disputants. A mediator with coercive power can enforce commitment from all the parties due 
to fear of the repercussions should there be divergence.  Watkins and Winters reached this 
conclusion, highlighting the importance of the mediator to allow flexibility in shifting roles 
according to the evolution of the conflict30.  
Touval points out that the definition of mediation in the intrastate conflicts constitutes an 
infringement of sovereignty and interference in the internal affairs of a state31. It is on these 
grounds that rejection of mediation can be based. Article 2(7) of the United Nations Charter 
protects the right of sovereignty of its member-states and intervention without invitation is a 
violation of this right. However, on many occasions this right has been violated without the UN 
protecting it. Membership to international and regional organizations can compromise the right 
to sovereignty. The African Union is obligated by its Charter to intervene in the countries of 
member states in a case of human rights violation. Membership of Zimbabwe in SADC placed an 
obligation on SADC to intervene and bring political, as well as economic peace, in Zimbabwe. 
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Touval asserts that where governments are party to a conflict, accepting mediation may 
epitomize surrender and acceptance of equal status to the opponents32. In Zimbabwe, the 
ZANU PF was reinstated by the widely condemned run-off elections in which Mugabe was the 
sole candidate. Agreeing to negotiate with the opposition, could be argued to be the 
government’s epitome that it saw itself as an equal partner to the MDC. Another interesting 
point Touval33 puts forward with regard to accepting or rejecting mediation is the issue of costs 
and benefits of mediation. The weaker party is usually the first to accept mediation because 
“some involvement by a third party is better than none”34. While the stronger party, usually the 
government, is likely to reject because of the status it enjoys. However, the costs of continued 
conflict are a considerable measure to the parties’ decision to accept or reject mediation. It is 
agreed that, “the stronger disputant will not willingly accept an intervener who is both biased 
and has coercive power, but may be open to accept an ally of the weaker party who has 
resources to offer as compensation”35 . There are several reasons why disputants accept 
mediation, but what is an important to bear in mind are the repercussions of accepting or 
rejecting of the mediation.   
Timing of mediation 
Research shows that intervention that takes place at the early stage could fail. Once the conflict 
has reached a certain stage, it has a potential to attract various third parties. Ripeness theory 
suggests that early intervention could prove to be ineffective due to the level of conflict. The 
parties’ will to resolve conflict on their own individual terms should be exhausted. Intervening 
when adversaries still believe that they can come up with a solution unilaterally may prove to 
be unsuccessful. Zartman and others believe that for the intervention to be successful it must 
coincide with stalemates36. As noted above, this is the point at which both parties to the 
conflict have realized that they need each other to find a resolution. One may ask why then 
invite a third party to help find a solution? Why can’t the adversaries sit down and put their 
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concerns forward and reach an agreement? The consensus reached by scholars of conflict 
resolution is that stalemates may occur, but a mediator will still be necessary to help mend the 
relationship between the disputants. Usually, agreements require a compromise between the 
parties. The tensions accumulated during the conflict makes it difficult for the parties to trust 
each other, thus, inviting a facilitator of communication becomes important. 
 “The Structuralist school places considerable importance on the dynamics of conflict and the 
interests of parties, arguing that mediated interventions that are not timed to coincide with 
hurting stalemates run a real risk of failure.”37 This school also emphasizes a need for a strategy 
of peace making and mediation in order to know how to create stalemates.  
An understanding of the dynamics of the conflict cycle can help create stalemates, thereby, 
determining the entry point.  While the socio-psychological approach supports the view that 
early intervention is important due to the belief that once relations have deteriorated,  because 
violence and attitudes are embedded in “we-they” images of the enemy, it becomes more 
difficult for the mediator to move the parties to change their perceptions38. The dynamics of 
the conflict will determine when to intervene. In Zimbabwe, previous interventions by different 
mediators proved to be unsuccessful because the conflict was not ripe for intervention, and 
little if any, tactics were used to create stalemates. Although the country was under sanctions 
by the United States and Britain for quite some time, it failed to create stalemates.  
 Pre-negotiation phase 
Zartman and Berman have divided the process of negotiation into three stages namely: the pre-
negotiation stage, the formula stage, and the detail stage.39  Pre-negotiation stage can be 
described as a time when the mediator holds side meetings with the adversaries to draft the 
agenda. Zartman describes this as “a learning process that allows the parties to readjust their 
perceptions toward each other, toward the mediator, and toward the conflict.”40 In intrastate 
conflict, it is during this time that the mediator will sort to convince the belligerents to come to 
                                                          
37 Crocker, Hampson and Aall, ”Herding Cats: Multiparty mediation in A complex world”,  Washington, USIP, 1999,p22 
38 Ibid,p25 
39 Berridge, G.R: Diplomacy: Theory and Practice, Prentice Hall, Upper Saddle River, New Jersey, 1995,p119 
40 Zartman,IW, “The Problem”, in Getting, Maundi, M,  USIP, Washington DC,2006,p3 
21 
 
the negotiation table and agree to a cease fire. The nature of these meetings is informal. 
Although, accepting a mediator is a symbol of agreeing to negotiate, parties do not always face 
each other with ease. It should be borne in mind that these adversaries have developed certain 
perceptions about each other and the level of trust is very low. Thus, maintaining hardliner 
positions is likely to happen.  Agreeing to negotiate does not mean agreeing to a solution, but 
to a process where it is hoped to bring about a solution. 
Drafting an agenda is a form of negotiation on its own. The nature of this stage makes it difficult 
for some scholars to accept it as pre-negotiation because negotiation begins with consultation. 
The notable difference between this stage and the second one lies in the formality of 
negotiation. Saunders summarizes pre-negotiation as a “whole range of activity conducted 
prior to the first stage of formal substantive or around-the-table negotiation”41. According to 
this definition, these activities are aimed at achieving an agreement on three issues namely; the 
agreement or outcome hoped to be achieved, the agenda, and the manner in which negotiation 
will be conducted. 42The first stage provides the purpose of the negotiations. When the parties 
agree to negotiate, this symbolizes their acceptance of a mutually hurting stalemate. The 
parties are now agreeing that negotiating is the only way out of this hurting stalemate. Prior to 
this, parties believe that they can have their way through military imbalances, and therefore, a 
need to negotiate is not significant. However, recognizing a need to negotiate does not mean 
that parties will automatically sit at the table and negotiate. It is the duty of the third-party to 
convince the parties to commit to a negotiated settlement, without weakening their positions. 
“Third-parties may be calling for gestures of good will but stepping up the antagonist’s flank 
from domestic hard-liners”43. Powerful mediators have the ability to create stalemates, 
thereby, pushing the parties to accepting mediation. In the Zimbabwe case, the Western 
powers can be argued to have helped create stalemates, through economic and political 
sanctions. When the parties realized that the economy had reached astronomical heights, it 
propelled them to move towards the negotiating table. ZANU PF had power as a ruling party 
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and as a party that had some degree of control of the security and police apparatus, but the 
power was not enough to enable it to function in a dead economy. Its international relations 
were weak and affected its economy since it could not access international funding. Thus, the 
MDC had the potential to save the economy because it enjoyed good relations with the West 
from whom it received funding.  
On the other hand, the MDC could not help with the recovery of the economy without political 
power. From this it becomes clear that both parties were blocking each other’s solutions.  As 
Masungure, a Professor at the University of Zimbabwe, commented prior to the negotiations 
saying, “dialogue is unavoidable and inevitable. Neither of the parties has a solution to the 
country’s structural problems on his own. Tsvangirai may have the legitimacy but he does not 
have political power. While Mugabe’s legitimacy may be questionable, he has the means to 
remain in power.”44 The analyses have overlooked the essential element of political science, 
and that is power politics. As the conflict evolved, there have been power shifts which shaped 
its history.  
When the parties accept that a hurting stalemate exists and that it could only be resolved 
through negotiation, it is argued “to be the beginning of true negotiation”45. As Saunders has 
noted that pre-negotiation can be more difficult than reaching an agreement once the 
negotiation have commenced, this stage is crucial. It is worth noting that this preparation 
period does not take place in a ‘political vacuum’; there are other developments that may 
impede the negotiations. This was the case in South Africa during the Convention on 
Democratic South Africa, whereby the violence that took place in some parts of the country, 
almost disrupted the elections. It is, therefore, essential for the parties to be domestically 
secure, in terms of security by state organs. If this is not the case, there is a likelihood that the 
concessions already made can be reversed as parties feel they are being taken advantage of. In 
Zimbabwe, during the pre-negotiation phase, there were reports of disturbing occurrences, 
both domestically and internationally. Domestically, there were reports of alleged state 
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sponsored violence that took place with MDC supporters being massacred country wide that 
they had to seek refuge in the South African embassy46. Internationally, the European Union, 
through its chair, declared that it would not accept any Zimbabwe government if it is under the 
leadership of Morgan Tsvangirai47. This hardened the ZANU position against what it perceived 
as Western imperialism. At the same time it, delayed the transfer of power by the Mugabe 
government through the mediation process. While SADC was trying to find a solution to the 
situation in Zimbabwe, the European Union and its allies were escalating the conflict through 
the crippling of the Zimbabwean economy with economic sanctions48. The impact that these 
sanctions had on the conflict will be examined later in this thesis. 
It is noted that “pre-negotiations are most likely to succeed if incidents that cause public alarm 
are avoided”49. Although it is important that such incidents should be avoided throughout the 
negotiations, the pre-negotiation stage is of utmost importance. The reason is that during this 
time, parties are still very sensitive about concessions they will make and the levels of trust are 
very low. Major incidents can convince parties that negotiations are a waste of time, thereby 
resorting to their previous positions. However, this may be hard to avoid, especially if these 
incidents are external. In Zimbabwe reports of the alleged state-sponsored violence against the 
MDC members and leaders are an example of incidents that caused public alarm. The images 
shown by the Western media indicated the decline of the rule of law. This made it difficult for 
the mediator to get the negotiations started.  Domestically, not everyone supports 
negotiations. Some groups will deliberately cause such incidents to cause the negotiations to 
break off. For example, such was the case in South Africa, whereby a pro-Afrikaans group of 
protesters invaded the World Trade Center where the negotiations were held.50 
There are several reasons as to why these incidents should be avoided including: “they put 
pressure on the leaders to increase their demands; they also give them a pretext, if they want 
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one, to avoid or break off initial contacts with the other side”51. The duties of a mediator are 
also limited by the stability of domestic affairs where parties’ interests are at stake. The 
condemnation of Mugabe by the African Union members at the AU Summit in Egypt, hardened 
his position on the negotiations, as well as increased his demands. Although Mbeki tried to 
convince his fellow leaders about the progress of the talks, Tsvangirai’s faith in Mbeki’s 
mediation deteriorated. This was evidenced by a request to the AU and SADC on an expanded 
mediation team, consisting of the “envoy that brokered a deal in Kenya”52, as a condition for his 
party to come to the negotiating table. As it was noted earlier, a mediator who possesses 
persuasion skills has an advantage. The more persistent the mediator is, the more likely he/she 
will be able to bring the parties back to the negotiating table. 
Part two of the pre-negotiation stage is the agenda. The parties need to agree on the issues 
that will inform the negotiations. This ranges from small to more complicated issues. It is widely 
recommended that parties put issues of common interest that they agree on, at the top of the 
agenda. It is believed that when parties agree on smaller issues, it provides a platform for 
compromise on more complicated issues.  This was reflected in the Zimbabwe negotiation in 
the Memorandum of Understanding. In most cases, parties link issues to get the other party to 
concede on issues that are in their interest, through putting opponent’s sensitive issue as a 
condition for their bargain. “Such was the case with the American proposal, first made in early 
1980s, that the South African withdrawal from Namibia and Cuban as well as the ANC 
withdrawal from Angola should be linked. The assumption being that the withdrawal of one 
would be the price for the withdrawal by the other”53. It is worth noting that parties differ on 
the importance of issues to be discussed. Some issues will be important to one party and 
should be discussed, while the other feels it should not be discussed. “However, when the 
agenda is being constructed a party which knows that it will never get the other to agree to 
inscription of a specific item, may strive to secure a vague agenda in order to be able to bring 
up the issue in which it is interested once the real talks get under way”54.  Such was the case in 
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Zimbabwe with regard to the land question. The MDC was expected to put it on the agenda as 
one of the pressing issues, while ZANU PF tried to avoid discussing this issue since it was its 
policies on land that exacerbated the situation in the first place. Parties usually put issues of 
their interest on the agenda in the expectation that they will have to give some concessions 
while receiving similar concessions from the other party(s). The problem arises when the other 
party does not concede as expected and this may take the negotiations back to square one. It 
takes the skill of a mediator to be strong enough to ensure that parties keep to the agreed 
concessions. Such was the case in the Lancaster Agreement where the mediator, Lord 
Carrington, was strict on going back to issues already sealed. 
As soon as there has been an agreement on the agenda, the last part of the pre-negotiation 
phase is the procedure for the negotiations. Berridge55 lists four factors guiding the procedure 
for negotiations, namely: format, venue, level and composition of delegations and timing. On 
the format of talks, one is looking at whether the talks will be a face-to-face between the 
leaders or through their representatives. Using the Congress on Democratic South Africa 
(CODESA) example, the presence of the leaders was necessary to avoid delays in reaching  
agreement due to the parties have to go back and consult with the principals of their party. 
Working Committee Two delayed the whole conference because the National Party delegate 
took a hard-line position to resist pressure from his opponents, stating that he had to consult 
with the party president, F.W. De Klerk before he could agree to the proposals on the table.  
The venue for the negotiations must be in an environment conducive to all parties and where 
there will be fewer disruptions. The international relations trend has been that negotiations are 
held under the auspices of an international or regional organization, sometimes in the country 
of conflict, but mostly outside the country so that the parties are taken out of their conflictual 
environment.  It is important that negotiations must maintain secrecy. The venue at which they 
are held must allow enough secrecy that only what the parties agree to publicize will be known 
to the public. Leaking of information may lead to it being used for propaganda purposes by 
either one or the other party to cause instability. The secretive nature of negotiations is 
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understandable, but transparency can help prevent media speculations and the assumptions.  
As mentioned in the Rationale, the issue of secrecy can also be perceived in a negative light. For 
example the secrecy of the Zimbabwe negotiations was widely criticized and different opinions 
were voiced regarding the issue of the right of the public to know the contents of the 
negotiation. The press only knew that they were held somewhere in Pretoria and not the exact 
venue. However, the point has been made that one or other of the parties perceive the media 
as having a record for “blowing things out of proportion” and thereby causing unnecessary 
public protests, that this was one of the reasons for the secrecy of the meetings. “Some venues 
are chosen for negotiations because either they are by convention or by law they are neutral 
ground”56. Pretoria is the capital of South Africa and was convenient for the mediator, former 
President Mbeki, who at the time still had to perform his duties as the president of the Republic 
of South Africa.  As both parties are based in Zimbabwe, the choice of venue firstly required 
them to travel to South Africa and secondly they both enjoyed neutrality of the venue. The 
environment in South Africa was neutral and away from incidents that could be brought by 
those opposed to negotiations. However because the spill-over effects of the Zimbabwe conflict 
were felt in South Africa as witnessed by the xenophobic attacks which took place in South 
Africa in May 2008.  Many victims were from Zimbabwe seeking refuge in their neighboring 
country, these attacks, to some extent, negated the neutrality of the venue.   In the next 
chapters, this topic will be discussed further 
The level and composition of delegation looks at the number of representatives per party and 
how they will engage in the negotiations. Sometimes the delegation comprises working groups 
who are tasked with dealing with specific issues and then report back to the negotiation table. 
The SADC led mediation comprised delegations from ZANU PF, as well as the two factions of 
the MDC. As the leaders of the parties did not take part in the roundtable negotiations, 
delegates had to report back to their principals in Harare. This impacts on the process as it 
causes time delays. In the Zimbabwean case, when the talks reached a deadlock, Mbeki 
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reported that he was giving the parties two weeks to think through the offer that he be given 
the post of Prime Minister, while Mugabe retained the Presidency. In reality both parties took 
more than the scheduled time. This illustrates the necessity for offers made in the negotiation 
process to have a set timeframe as this indicates to the parties the seriousness about reaching 
an outcome.  While in some case the complexity of issues makes it extremely challenging for 
negotiations to be concluded within the set timeframe, setting a timeframe is useful for 
guideline purposes. The aim of negotiating is to find a solution suitable to all parties to a 
conflict. In essence the value of using negotiation as a form of resolving conflict is that the 
parties “own” the process as they seek and agree on their own solutions with the assistance of 
an impartial mediator.  Thus, timing is crucial to a successful negotiation successful. “The 
possibility that favorable circumstances are unlikely to last forever argues for a prompt start- 
but pressing for this may suggest weakness.”57 Timeframes assist in creating these 
circumstances.  
 
Attributes of a mediator  
“Effective mediators are often driven by the desire to redress almost impossible situations in 
which combatants are incapable of finding solutions on their own”58. Mediators aim to help 
adversaries reconsider their positions and attitudes towards the conflict. The intervener must 
seek to redirect parties towards areas of common interests rather than diversity. Kressel and 
Pruitt point out that, a “mediator’s power as a dispute resolution device lies precisely in its 
capacity to help deal with the problems created by dispute selection and elaboration and 
therefore in its capacity to deescalate the conflict.”59Among the many functions of the 
mediator, Carnevale and Pruitt add “shuttling between parties who cannot or will not meet, 
interpreting statements made by parties who do not understand each other, encouraging trust 
or suggesting agreements that do not require trust, allowing a proud party to concede to the 
                                                          
57
 Touval, S, Zartman,IW, p134 
58
 Journal of Election: Kenya 
59 Kressel, Pruitt, 1989 
28 
 
mediator instead of the other party…”60  Cooks61 notes that mediators run a real risk of being 
used as a scapegoat by the disputants.62This was the case in Zimbabwe where the MDC kept 
questioning Mbeki’s impartiality each time the negotiations hit a deadlock. If this is the case, 
what skills should the mediator then, possess? Research shows that the most important role of 
the mediator is to act as a communicator between the disputants. This idea comes from an 
understanding of conflict as “the breakdown of communications, with parties becoming locked 
in a situation they cannot escape simply because they dare not contact each other directly.”63 
This is rather a passive role of a mediator. Facilitation of communication is essential, but a 
mediator can play a more active role such as being a formulator. “Mediators must be capable of 
innovative thinking that is not possible for the parties to the conflict, constrained as they are by 
their commitments”.64 The mediator must be able to see beyond the surface of the conflict. It is 
suggested that mediators need to add the qualities of creativeness and invention to the 
communicator’s traits of tact and empathy, and must seek to discover the parties’ real and 
basic interests, and their component ingredients.65 Mediators with facilitative power are said to 
possess little, if any power, over the parties since they are not in a position to punish the parties 
should they fail to honor the agreement.  
As it was mentioned earlier, disputants prefer mediators who possess the power to hold them 
accountable to the agreements reached by the parties. Thus bargaining power also becomes 
essential. They can use persuasion to get the disputants to rethink solutions and areas of 
compromise. This method was used by Mbeki throughout his mediation in Zimbabwe. Even 
during the negotiations, he refrained from imposing a solution on the Zimbabweans. This 
method was widely criticized both regionally and internationally. ‘Quiet diplomacy’, which was 
a term used to explain South Africa’s position toward Zimbabwe, was viewed as non-
engagement. The international audiences expected Mbeki to condemn Mugabe in public to 
show dissociation with him. The so called ‘megaphone diplomacy’ could be argued to have not 
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been applicable in the Zimbabwe case, due to the failure of the sanctions by the EU, 
Commonwealth and the US to achieve a solution.  The division among AU members over the 
issue would have presented problems to South Africa. This debate around the diplomatic 
stance taken by SA over Zimbabwe will be discussed in the next chapters.  
It was noted earlier that a mediator should be able to use stalemates to his/her advantage as 
this will emphasize the importance for negotiation. A third role that the mediator plays is that 
of the mediator as a manipulator. This is viewed as a structural role in the sense that the 
mediator empowers him/herself with bargaining power. In this situation both parties believe 
that the mediator will form a partnership with either of them should mediation 
breakdown.66Such was the case in the Lancaster negotiation that resulted in the independence 
of Zimbabwe, whereby Lord Carrington “threatened diplomatic recognition of Mugabe’s 
opponents if he proved less compliant than what they were.”67 Pruitt observes that when the 
conflict is ripe, it is easy for mediators to apply light tactics as compared to unripe conflict. In 
Zimbabwe, Mugabe still believed that he could win in the field, thus Lord Carrington had to 
manipulate Mugabe’s allies to put pressure on him into accepting the agreement. This tactic 
was mentioned earlier as important in creating stalemates.68  
Mediators are encouraged to always maintain their role as mediators, so that they can facilitate 
parties to come up with solutions. However, they should be able to switch roles, from 
facilitating to bargaining should there be a need to do so.   Nelson Mandela used this power 
when mediating the conflict in Burundi when he threatened the adversaries that he would quit 
if they did not sign an agreement within the agreed time. Although he was criticized for being 
“inflexible, stubborn and impervious to any advice or any external influence on his 
management of the peace process”69, his pressure brought results. Thus, a mediator with 
bargaining power has the potential to succeed. Research shows that self-confidence and self-
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efficacy are desirable attributes for mediators. William Simkin notes, that “sufficient personal 
drive and ego, qualified by a willingness to be self-efficacing is a desirable quality in a 
mediator”.70  Oettingen adds that “perceived self-efficacy correlates with raised aspirations, 
reduced fear of failure, and improved problem-focused analytic thinking.71 Another interesting 
quality worth noting is propensity to trust if it induces reciprocation, because mediators do rely 
on the trust of the disputants.72 This quality is usually associated with high ethical standards as 
well as moral behavior. Lessons that can be learned from the troika that mediated in Kenya is 
that patience, persuasion and tenacity are important skills for a mediator. “Kofi Annan had the 
capability to shame, threaten and harangue the parties at decisive moments”73. He did not 
restrict himself to being a facilitator of communication. Benjamin Mkapa, the former Tanzanian 
President, added forthrightness and also firmness. While Graça Machel, with her international 
experience, was armed with feminine stamina and sharpness and succeeded in disarming the 
parties at crucial phases of mediation74. These are essential attributes for mediation.  
As mentioned in the preceding paragraphs firmness by the mediator is crucial to the mediation 
process. The combination of attributes that each member of the troika brought the process as 
well as inclusion of strong elder statesmen, gave the mediation power and authority. This was 
the case in Kenya; it would have been difficult for the disputants to reject mediation. Lieberfield 
stresses the importance of “fundamental belief in human values and potentials, tempered by 
the ability to assess personal weaknesses as well as strengths”75. Boulie, quoted in Lieberfield, 
emphasizes empathy, the ability to understand others’ point of view,76 as being necessary for 
successful mediators. A mediator who understands how parties feel about issues can always 
adjust his/her approach during the process of mediation to allow sufficient time accordingly. 
The ability to define the problem will help the mediator to allow flexibility when necessary. 
However, firmness is important to ensure that parties stick to the terms of the process. 
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This chapter has defined negotiation as a process whereby two or more adversaries, after 
reaching a stalemate in a conflict, come together to the negotiation table and make 
concessions from their positions in pursuit of a common solution. The theory of “hurting 
stalemates” was argued to be essential for the transformation of conflict. This theory suggests 
that adversaries need to move from zero-sum attitudes to positive mentalities. This comes with 
the realization that the solution can no longer be attained individually, but that parties need 
each other to find that common solution. This theory holds when contextualized in the 
Zimbabwe scenario in which negotiation was agreed to when the political rivals realized that 
they needed each other to find a solution. It was held that although the MDC had legitimacy 
based on the March 2008 general election and the support of the western countries who 
promised to assist MDC to revive the economy; Mugabe and his ZANU –PF still had political as 
well as military power. The power imbalances in Zimbabwe led to the negotiations mediated by 
the former South African president Thabo Mbeki. 
Mediation was defined as process in which a third-party is invited to facilitate a dialogue 
between disputing parties who cannot do it on their own. It was also argued that mediation by 
definition causes an infringement of sovereignty. Acceptance of a third-party intervention by 
the disputants compromises the sovereignty of their country. This presents a problem in 
gaining entry in intrastate conflict. The most important aspects of mediation are that a 
mediator must be accepted by all disputants and the mediator must be impartial.   The body or 
individual who wishes to intervene in a conflict must be trusted by all parties involved. If one 
party does not accept a mediator, they are not likely to take any instruction from them; neither 
will they be prepared to give any concessions.  The impartiality of the mediator does influence 
their acceptance to certain extent. A mediator must not pursue any interest in the conflict since 
their mediation is likely to influence their desired outcome. However, it was suggested that 
mediators always have interests, even if it is for the greater good, such as regional stability. 
South Africa and SADC were found to have had an interest in mediating the conflict in 
Zimbabwe. For the former, avoiding spillover effects and championing its idea of an African 
Renaissance and economic development, through the NEPAD and other mechanisms, made it 
essential to ensure good governance through the creation of democratic spaces. And for the 
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latter, it had to prove its effectiveness as an established regional body that upholds its 
principles on democratic elections and good governance. 
 
 This introduction discussed different kinds of mediators and SADC mediation can be said to 
have been of facilitation in nature. This was due to Mbeki’s role as a communicator than an 
imposer of a solution. Throughout the mediation he maintained his position of facilitating a 
process that enabled the Zimbabweans to find their own solution as Zimbabweans and he 
continued to invite other external actors to follow suit. This introduction also held that 
negotiation involves three different stages namely: pre-negotiations, round-table negotiation, 
and reaching an agreement. It argued that getting the parties to come to the table was the 
most difficult part of negotiation process. 
 
Chapterization 
Chapter one discusses the theories of mediation and negotiation. Chapter two gives the 
background to the conflict including a discussion of the 2002 and 2008 elections dating back to 
the Constitutional referendum in 2000.   Chapter three then looks into the previous 
interventions by different bodies and, eventually that of the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC). Chapter Four discusses the power- sharing deal. It gives a narrative and 
chronology of the events as they unfolded in 2008. It also offers an analysis of the mediation 
process. Chapter five evaluates the global political agreement (GPA) and discusses the 
constraints as well as progress made since the agreement was signed. It makes some 
recommendations as well. 
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Chapter Two 
Elections and democratization in Africa: The Zimbabwe case 
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Elections are often seen as a yardstick for democracy as they are said to help institutionalize a 
democratic system of governance. However, in Africa, elections have not delivered on the 
promise of democracy that is: the strengthening of democracy and its institutions, the power to 
choose leaders through the ballot, peace and stability as a result of consensus reached through 
majority voting, and economic development. Some have argued that democracy is a foreign 
concept in Africa and therefore its implementation was bound to be problematic. History has 
provided clear evidence of independent leaders who fought imperialism and adopted 
democracy as a new system of governance. The very same leaders amended the rules to cling 
to power, and this led to calls for violent removals.  When it comes to democracy, there is no 
one-size fit all rule. “Democracy is meaningless if does not take into account the cultural 
diversity, religion, history, and sociology of the society in question.”77 
 African states in particular, share a history of colonialism and this concept of democracy has 
had to redress the old structures of the colonial society and reflect the new order based on 
equality before the law, respect for basic human rights and, maintenance of the rule of law. 
Democracy in Europe cannot be implemented the same way as in Africa due the different 
historical backgrounds. African leaders inherited colonial authoritarian states which did not 
recognize human rights and majority rule as important. Their main duty was to transform these 
states to consolidate democracy and its institutions to reflect the new order. However, what we 
saw in many African countries, including Zimbabwe, was the replacement of personnel and not 
necessary the transformation of institutions that governed under the old system. The state 
retained its authoritarian nature and therefore failed to deliver on the promises of democracy. 
Zimbabwe was not immune to this scenario, in the sense that the violence that took place 
during the Smith regime continued to define Zimbabwe’s political nature. The Matabeleland 
uprisings, shortly after Zimbabwe came into being, and which lasted until a Unity Accord was 
signed in 1987 between ZAPU PF led by Joshua Nkomo and the ZANU-PF led by Robert Mugabe, 
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was a clear scenario that the violent nature of the Zimbabwean state had not been 
transformed.  
The Constitution did not become the supreme law of the country since the Prime Minister 
could entrench himself into the position of a president. Professor Tawana Kupe78 is of the view 
that African leaders adopted a system of democracy without having a full understanding of its 
meaning. He argues that these leaders had no idea of the kind of democracy they wanted, as a 
result, they ended up adopting a system they did not believe in, that is an electoral democracy. 
He adds that when the system proves to not favor them, they turn against it and substitute 
ballots for bullets. They support democracy for as long as it sustains their power79. This chapter 
will discuss the electoral process in Zimbabwe with an understanding that it resulted from 
failure to transform the state from a colonial state to a democratic state, which has led to 
election-related conflict in this Zimbabwe.  
International Conventions recognizing free and fair elections 
Mazonge suggests that a constitution should be an agreement among all people on how they 
are to be governed. Any constitution must answer two main questions: How do political rulers 
come into power? How do they leave office? The answer to both questions is: free and fair 
elections in a multiparty democracy should determine entry into and exit from political office.80 
There needs to be an agreement on the framework on how to implement this. Importantly, the 
people must agree on the kind of electoral system they want in place. There are three most 
used electoral systems that countries normally choose from namely: proportional 
representation, first-past-the-post, and the mixed system. Whichever system a country chooses 
must ensure “fair electoral practices; proper representation; accountability; inclusiveness; 
transparency and; tolerance and respect for diversity.”81 Reynolds and Reilly add that the 
electoral system should: 
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Ensure a representative parliament; 
Make elections accessible and meaningful; 
Provide an incentive for conciliation; 
Facilitate the creation of a stable and efficient government; 
Encourage cross-cutting political parties and; 
Promote parliamentary opposition.82 
There are international and regional conventions that are aimed at promoting democracy and 
respect for political rights of citizens to which Zimbabwe is a signatory. Article 21 of the United 
Nations Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 provides that; everyone has a right to participate 
in their country’s government through democratic spaces; the right to equal access to public 
service and; base this on universal suffrage. The African Charter on Human and People’ Rights 
of 1963 also enshrines these rights in Article 13 Article 25 (a) and (b) of the 1966 International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) concurs with the previous statutes. Article 7 of 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), concurs 
with the UNDHR to obligate its members to eliminate all forms of discrimination against women 
in the political and public life.  Article 5 of the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of 
Racial Discrimination (CERD) states: ‘in compliance with the fundamental obligations laid down 
in article 2 of this Convention, States Parties undertake to prohibit and to eliminate racial 
discrimination in all its forms and guarantee the right of everyone, without distinction as to 
race, color, or national or ethnic origin, to equality before the law.’83 
Apart from the above international Conventions to which Zimbabwe is a signatory there are 
generally accepted universal standards for free and fair elections which apply to every 
democracy. The UNDHR recognizes free and fair elections as basic human rights and the 
following are the accepted standards governing these: “an appropriate legal and constitutional 
framework for elections; an appropriate administration and financial framework for the 
conduct of elections; freedom of movement; freedom of association/ assembly; freedom of 
                                                          
82 Reynolds A and Reilly B, International IDEA Handbook of Electoral System Design. Stockholm: Sweden, 2002 
83 Madzonga, P and D. Mashingaidze, OpCit, p7 
37 
 
expression; voter registration; right to vote; secret ballot; counting and results tabulation; 
transparency, monitoring and observation; challenges to election results and; reasonably 
balanced field.”84 The United Nations is guided by these principles and, therefore, Zimbabwe, as 
a signatory to this Declaration, is obliged to abide by them.  The African Union seeks to evaluate 
governance systems in African countries. NEPAD is one mechanism aimed to assists these 
countries to strengthen democratic participation and governance.  “The NEPAD Heads State 
forums are meant to monitor and assess the progress of African countries in adherence to their 
commitment to achieving good governance and social reform.”85 The African Peer Review 
Mechanism (APRM) which functions under NEPAD, is meant to ensure that policies and 
practices of participating states conform to agreed on political, economic and corporate 
governance values, codes and standards contained in the Declaration of Democracy, Political, 
Economic and Corporate Governance.86However, as the requirement is that countries need to  
voluntarily agree to participate in the APRM before they can be subjected to the review, this 
does not make it very effective since countries can choose not to become a member, as is the 
case with Zimbabwe? 
Understanding democracy 
Dr Khabele Matlosa asserts that democracy can be understood to mean “just procedural and 
limited to electioneering (a la electoral democracy)”87 as its minimum approach. Secondly, he 
defines democracy as “institutional dimensions with emphasis on promotion and protection of 
civil and political rights (a la liberal democracy) beyond sheer electioneering.”88 This definition 
resonates well in Southern Africa in countries where democracy is said to have been 
consolidated. Too many in the SADC region, have understood democracy to mean the 
enjoyment of political rights and the establishment of institutions fundamental to consolidating 
democracy.  However these democracies have not yet yielded economic benefits to ordinary 
citizens.  
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The highest level of democracy has the “socio-economic characteristics that transcend 
electioneering and civil and political rights mantra (a la social/developmental democracy).”89 
This definition of democracy is yet to deliver to the African people. The colonial states inherited 
by the African leaders have not made it possible to give economic meaning to the concept of 
democracy90. What is common about these definitions is that they make elections a central 
point. Although elections are instrumental to democracy, they are not an end in themselves but 
a means to an end.   Dr Brigalia Bam, the chairperson of the Independent Electoral Commission 
of South Africa (IEC), 91asserted that voting is just a single note in an orchestra of democracy. 
Free and fair elections, freedom of expression, equality before the law and due process are all 
aspects of democracy that we should not forget92.  
Elections do not necessarily amount to democratic culture and practice. Various other 
determinants are also essential such as multipartyism, constitutional engineering and the rule 
of law, gender inclusivity in the governance process, electoral system designs and reforms, 
transparent and accountable management of national affairs including elections themselves, 
responsive and responsible conduct by political parties, constructive management of various 
types of conflict and the form and content of external assistance for democracy.93  In 
Zimbabwe, elections have been held periodically as stipulated by the constitution. This country 
has an independent judiciary which is not always favorable to the government or the ruling 
party.  Like any country, it has experienced problems in its past elections, but the most 
important point is that holding of elections has been a step towards the right direction. 
However, “the stark reality on the ground reveals the extent to which regular elections, that 
have marked Zimbabwe’s electoral democracy since 1980, have not in fact not deepened 
democracy.”94 This means that democratization is a process which begins way before the first 
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transitional elections and is a continuous process. The challenge now for Zimbabwe is for the 
country to nurture and consolidate democratic governance - a process which depends very 
much on complex and interrelated institutional and political processes.95 In South Africa the 
Constitutional Assembly was established specifically with the responsibility for drafting the final 
Constitution before the 1994 multiparty elections. An Interim Constitution was adopted to 
guide the democratic process paving the way to the elections. The South African example 
shows how democracy is broader and goes beyond just elections. Elections are just another 
component of democracy.  The question then arises: Why pay so much attention to elections? 
Particularly as elections have resulted in election-related conflicts in Africa. These conflicts have 
reversed the gains made under democracy, especially, economic gains. Thus, discussions on 
elections become essential to ensure the smooth transfer of power.  
Matlosa suggests that weak institutions make governance rotate around individuals, and then 
democracy becomes a personality cult which makes it to become highly conflictual with the 
conflict trends crossing boundaries into violence.96 From this statement, it becomes clear that 
elections have move from being democracy-centered into power struggles between individuals. 
When this happens, leaders end up seeing themselves as being above the political parties that 
they represent, and this may result in their being removed by violence. One view that has been 
given a lot of attention elsewhere is that the state in Africa is a means of wealth accumulation 
due to weak economies.  Clinging to power has been associated with holding onto the wealth of 
the country.  According to Boas, “politics in Africa are a game played out on a marginal site, 
beyond institutionalized regulations in a Western bureaucratic sense”, while others maintain it 
to be a “typical extra-legal contest for political and economic domination between elites and 
politicians.”97 Matlosa argues that the “conflict becomes even more intense and violent during 
elections as stakes are raised higher with the contestation for state power and resources as 
well as politicization of social identity and cleavages.”98 In 2002, SADC countries adopted the 
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Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan, which resulted from the recognition by SADC 
leaders that they have common political values through democratic, legitimate and effective 
institutions.99 Therefore, the SADC Parliamentary Forum was established comprising 37 
members of parliament from both ruling and opposition parties in the SADC region. This body 
has taken an interest in election observation and the electoral processes.100 In as much as the 
SADC countries have tried to consolidate democracy in their respective countries, the issue of 
dominant party democracies has posed a problem. In most SADC countries, the ruling parties 
have stayed in power since the inception of democracy in their respective countries. Multiparty 
democracy has not taken its firm effect in this region. 
 
 There is still a set of extremely dangerous conflations between the ruling party, the state, and 
national identity.  These conflations are justified by the assertions that the only authentic ruling 
party is the one with liberation movements credentials (ZANU-PF in Zimbabwe, the ANC in 
South Africa, Frelimo in Mozambique, and SWAPO in Namibia), or that the only authentic form 
of government is traditional e.g. Swazi monarchy.101 The opposition parties in the region have 
not fully developed into alternative governments to the ruling parties. However, this notion of 
being voted for because of liberation credentials was challenged in the Zimbabwe elections of 
2005 and 2008, in which the opposition challenged the ruling party and won the election but 
failed to achieve the required two-thirds majority required for  the Presidential election 
respectively. EISA has described democracy to “constitute a set of values, principles and 
practices, and as involving the quality of relationships not simply between states and their 
people, but between people themselves.”102 There is an argument that colonialism did not die 
and is still living in Africa. This view emerges from how African governments rule, and of the 
grave consequences of militarization, militias and the blurred boundaries between the state’s 
legal and extra-legal activities.103 The incorporation of the war veterans in Zimbabwe is such an 
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example. The following section will look at the elections in the post- 2000 Zimbabwe. It will 
discuss the extent to which these have shape the political future of Zimbabwe. 
 
Elections in Zimbabwe 
The establishment of the SADC Parliamentary Forum was expected to provide a platform for 
members of parliament (MPs) to discuss governance issues, as well as to give more legitimacy 
to the Observer Mission Report because of its collective nature. It was also in response to the 
disagreement about the legitimacy of the 2000 elections in Zimbabwe by different Mission 
reports. The SADC ECF was established as a forum for the electoral management bodies (EMBs) 
and it produced a document in 1998 that entails common standards for successful elections, 
and these are: 
 The creation of a legitimate representative government; 
 The establishment of an independent, impartial and generally accepted electoral 
authority; 
 An electoral process that reflects best practice principles; 
 The existence of a level playing field;  
 The need for certain minimum social, political and human rights standards 
before, during and after the elections.104 
EISA’s mission report on the 2000 Zimbabwe elections held that Zimbabwe failed to meet any 
of the ECF’s five requirements for a successful election due to the following: the country’s 
multiple electoral authorities were state-appointed rather than independent and nonpartisan; 
the electoral process was marred by, among other problems, secrecy around and secret 
irregularities  in the voters’ roll as well as last minute changes to the electoral rules; the playing 
field was far from level given that President  Robert Mugabe’s ruling party  had 
disproportionate access to and coverage in the state-owned media.105 Accordingly, SADC failed 
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to uphold its own principles of holding a successful election. This sent out a negative message 
to the world that SADC lacks integrity and negated all that its stands for, namely: good 
governance, credible elections, credibility of its observer mission, are among others. This was 
an issue raised by the Commonwealth in its 2002 Observer Mission Report held that the pre-
election environment in Zimbabwe was not conducive for a free and fair election.  This was in 
contrast to the SADC and South African Observer Mission reports which held that they were 
free and fair and reflected the political will of the people of Zimbabwe.   Former South African 
President, Thabo Mbeki, defended his stance not to recognize the findings of the 
Commonwealth Observer Mission stating that it failed to spend enough time in Zimbabwe. He 
also raised the point that the Commonwealth had not considered the  Observer Mission reports 
of SADC and the South African government. 
 Dennis Kadima106, asserted that the experience of internal debates about Zimbabwe’s elections 
dramatically reinforced the need for a set of regional principles and guidelines to give credibility 
and direction to election monitoring and to ensure the integrity of elections.107 It was for this 
reason that the Principles for Election Management, Monitoring and Observation (PEMMO) 
were developed and adopted in 2003. This is a joint document developed by EISA and the SADC 
ECF.  The PEMMO stipulates provisions for pre-election, Election Day and the post-election 
period. It also includes code of conduct for the observers. The document is different from the 
other regional principles and guidelines in that it includes recommendations for best electoral 
practice.  It includes recommendations on for the inclusion of women in politics and election, as 
well as considers the impact of electoral systems in reflecting inclusivity of the choice of the 
electorate and it also looks at the constitutional and legal requirements for a credible and 
legitimate election.108However, this document is not enforceable. This limitation is common in 
the African continent, where instruments of the various bodies with regard to election 
guidelines lack legality. In Zimbabwe, the government took note of the   SADC principles that, in 
the parliamentary elections, translucent ballot boxes should be used, the poll should be 
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conducted in one day, and an independent electoral commission should be appointed in 
addition to the existing state-appointed and controlled election bodies.109  AT the same time 
the government chose to leave out other requirements outlined in the SADC principles. The 
limitation of SADC to hold countries accountable for failure to uphold agreed principles and 
guidelines compromises the legitimacy of its observer mission. 
2000 Elections 
The 2000 elections were marked by unprecedented levels of violence and intimidation; 
partisanship by the law enforcement agencies and the public media whose statements blatantly 
indicated their support for the ruling party; lack of transparency in some of the operations of 
the RGE and the Election Directorate, particularly with regard to the provision of information in 
their control relevant to the elections; and the furore over the accreditation of election 
monitors and observers.110 As a result, most observer missions could not declare the elections 
free and fair. The government accredited those who were considered to be friends with the 
ruling party, and did not accredit those missions whose outcome could not be guaranteed. The 
elections were held in the wake of a constitutional referendum which rejected the ruling party’s 
constitutional recommendation. The mood of bitterness which marked these elections resulted 
in with the breakdown of law and order. Violence perpetrated by the government security 
agencies left the ordinary citizens feeling unprotected, the government’s disregard of court 
orders compromised the credibility and independence of these institutions.  The environment 
could not be said to have been conducive for a free and fair election. 
2002 election 
The 2002 elections took place in what can be considered an unhealthy political climate. The 
MDC had just won the constitutional referendum, with the ruling party resorting to violence 
against MDC supporters. The result of the 2002 elections reflected a changing environment. 
While they indicated that Mugabe still had power; for the first time since independence  they 
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also showed that he had lost quite a lot of his popularity and support. The unbroken power 
enjoyed by the ZANU-PF for 20 years was now being challenged. The ruling party resorted to 
using its power to regain its support and to silence the opposition. “The election was more a 
personal quest for power than a constitutionally mandated process for the election of leaders. 
The essential conditions for free and fair elections did not exist.”111 The ruling party and the war 
veterans threatened to not accept anyone without war credentials to rule Zimbabwe. This was 
an indication that conflict would erupt should the MDC win the election. “The Zimbabwean 
politics were so polarized that whatever the result of that election it was unlikely to bring 
durable peace to the country.”112 
Organized and party-sanctioned violence was a central feature of the pre-election period. It is 
well documented that most of this violence was perpetrated by the ruling party with little of it 
attributable to the MDC. The Public and Security and Order Act which was promulgated at the 
beginning of the campaign period, was invoked against the opposition party and not the ruling 
party.113 This Act stipulated that four days’ notice should be given to the police ahead of any 
intended meeting or rally. There were incidents whereby the MDC would comply with the law, 
only to find that it would be revoked later on. The state security organs were biased in the way 
they treated the two political parties. The failure by these organs to maintain their 
independence allowed ZANU-PF to see itself as a state party, with election results confirming its 
rule.  The playing field was not level for a successful election. The “history of violent politics in 
Zimbabwe was the reason why some observers declared that the parliamentary elections of 
June 2000 and the presidential election of February 2002 were not free and fair.”114 
It was noted earlier on that the 2000 and 2002 elections were marked by political violence, 
mostly coming from the ZANU-PF. During this period, the MDC still believed that they could 
remove the ZANU-PF by violent means. This came from a statement by Tsvangirai after the 
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MDC lost the parliamentary election saying that, “if Mugabe did not step down peacefully, the 
MDC would remove him violently.”115 Tsvangirai and his MDC party knew that they did not have 
enough power to confront Mugabe, and this led to many in Africa believing that he would rely 
on assistance from the Western power that were also against Mugabe. There were numerous 
attempts by the MDC mobilized to pursue this idea, and the most notable one was the one that 
took place in June 2003, dubbed ‘the final push’.  These elections also failed to meet the 
regional standards of a successful election. In as much the violence came from both sides, the 
ruling party had the backing of the state security organs and the military. The playing field was 
not level as per the SADC requirement.  
2005 Elections 
The 2005 elections were widely declared to have been peaceful, credible and reflecting the will 
of the Zimbabwean people. This election served as a test for the electoral reforms that were 
implemented in 2004 as a result of the pressure from SADC. These reforms were in line with the 
SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections, as they included: 
 The establishment of a five-person Zimbabwe Electoral Commission  (ZEC); 
 The establishment of an ad hoc electoral court/tribunal within six months of 
elections; 
 The reduction of polling days from two to one; 
 An increase in polling stations as well as the abolition of mobile polling stations;  
 The use of visible indelible ink;  
 The replacement of wooden ballot boxes with transparent boxes.116 
 “The Zimbabwean government opened up the airwaves for campaigns by all political parties 
and even dismissed the much hated Jonathan Moyo from the Ministry of Information and from 
ZANU-PF.”117 The ZANU-PF government had been able to dismiss criticism by international 
                                                          
115
Journal of African Elections, OpCit, p27 
116 Journal of African Elections: Special Issue on Zimbabwe’s 2005 General Election, EISA, 2005, p56 
117 Nyago., Kintu. “Mugabe Wise  to Drop Prof. Moyo”, The Monitor, Kampala, 14 January, 
http://allafrica.com/stories/printable/200501130733.html  
46 
 
players of it past electoral conduct.118 Despite these findings, instead of encouraging a positive 
way forward, the anti-Mugabe group were said to have shifted their focus to manufactured 
evidence of vote rigging, trying to incite violent protest against the results, even when the 
leadership of the MDC declined to challenge the results.119  Choice Ndoro120 was of the view 
that repressive legislation and partisan institutions put in place to govern the previous two 
elections were perpetuated, with new personalities, new names and invigorated allegiance to 
the ruling party. Although she agrees that the violence was reduced, she maintains that the 
repressive legislation designed to favor the ruling party was not dismantled.121 It can be argued 
that albeit the reforms were in place, that ZEC was not independent at all, hence following the 
mediated settlement a totally new ZEC has been put in place.   
 
What distinguished this election from the previous ones were the reduced levels of violence 
during the election. The one way to explain this improvement on the levels of violence could be 
the fact that the political parties campaigned against violence. “Both the MDC and ZANU-PF 
sent constant messages to their supporters that the leadership would not tolerate any form of 
violence.”122 This enabled supporters from both political parties to hold their meetings and 
rallies next to each other with no intimidation or confrontation. However, due to expectations 
of violence, there was imaginary violence in the minds of many who did not want to accept that 
Zimbabwe had learnt its lesson from the isolation and that it could hold a credible election.123 
Norman Mlambo124 observed that even though Kofi Annan welcomed the elections as peaceful, 
bully countries such as the United States, through its former Secretary of State, Condoleezza 
Rice, labeled Zimbabwe an outpost of tyranny, while the British press demonized Jack Straw 
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and Prince Charles for shaking hands with Mugabe. He questioned the issue of double-
standards applied to Africa, sighting how the elections in Afghanistan and in Iraq, which took 
place under military occupation with bombs exploding everywhere and dozens of people being 
killed on the polling days, were seen as a step in the right direction by the international 
democracy activists.125 This concern becomes valid when one considers how the 2008 March 
elections were seen as free after the victory went to the MDC. The elections in Africa are free 
for as long as the outcome reflects the wishes of the western powers.  
According to Archbishop Pius Ncube, the situation that led to the 2005 presidential elections 
was far from being violence free. He went on to that the government was using its control over 
food supply to bribe the electorate. Young boys were recruited to torture and intimidate 
anyone suspected to be opposing the Mugabe government. The President allegedly warned 
these groups that they would be responsible if the ZANU-PF was defeated in the 2005 
election.126 The analysts, including the opposition leaders, overlooked the quality of electoral 
reform; they were satisfied with the announcement by the government. Their failure to 
question how the reforms were going to affect the next election and only raised their 
dissatisfaction, validates the view by Tawana Kupe that democratic rules are only as good as the 
put African leaders in power. As soon as a desired outcome is not achieved, they will not accept 
the result and use democratic institutions as a scapegoat. There were concerns about the 
media bias in favor of the ruling party.  
The presence of international observers brings some sort of assurance to the electorate that 
the outcome will reflect the will of the people. In countries known for vote rigging, 
international observers “may help prevent fraud during the balloting and counting process and 
can report to the international community on the overall fairness of an election process.” 127 
Why then were the observers not accredited in Zimbabwe? The first answer may be found in 
“Blair’s announcement, in response to a question in parliament that he intended to bring about 
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a regime change in Zimbabwe.” 128  This was also confirmed by its ally, the United States. 
Another reason may be that Britain, regarded as the number one enemy of the ZANU 
government by Mugabe, is a prominent member of the European Union as well as the 
Commonwealth. Their integrity could not be guaranteed without suspicion that they would 
push the British agenda. This view makes sense when one considers how Zimbabwean 
government had no problem inviting political neutral countries, such as South American, Asian 
and Caribbean, to come observe their elections. The Zimbabwe scenario raises a question of 
who holds accreditation for African elections.  Anyone would expect the answer to be regional 
as well as international bodies to which Zimbabwe is a member. Zimbabwe holds membership 
at SADC, African Union and the United Nations. The European Union lost its credibility as a 
neutral Observer when it advocated for regime change together with the United States. The 
SADC did not do much either on credibility in that it contradicted itself many times in its 
findings about the Zimbabwe situation. In as much as SADC declared the elections in that 
country as free and fair, as well argued that the SADC Principles and Guidelines were followed, 
it later admitted that the existing legislative framework and electoral conditions did not meet 
such criteria. Although it has been argued that amendments were made to the electoral laws to 
meet the SADC criteria, it also appears that these were minor and insignificant changes.  
2008 Elections 
The 2008 elections were a combination of Presidential and Parliamentary elections. This was 
unusual in Zimbabwe as these elections are usually held separately. The elections took place on 
the 29 March following a deadlock in the negotiations between the main political parties in 
Zimbabwe, mediated by the SADC under the facilitation of Thabo Mbeki. The outcome of this 
election was bound to shift the power positions in the negotiation process. Indeed, having the 
MDC winning majority of the votes in the legislature, albeit by a narrow margin, changed the 
political scene of Zimbabwe, as it meant. This meant that the power-sharing deal would have to 
be based on the outcome of this election. However, the unfolding of post- election events 
reflected a different scenario from what many had predicted. This will get more attention in the 
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following chapters. This election diverted attention from the election as an “event” to a 
“process”. This was due to the fact that the previous elections in Zimbabwe resulted in 
conflicting reports being produced by different observer missions. Therefore, this election was 
to test the implementation and compliance with the SADC as well as global standards of 
successful elections. 
The March elections started off on a controversial political footing in that they bore the stamp 
of being premature, rushed and inappropriate, given the ongoing negotiations mediated by 
SADC.129 The main trigger for mediation was the widespread ZANU-PF assaults on the 
opposition in early March 2007. The SADC Heads of States met in Tanzania on the 29th March 
2007, and appointed Mbeki to mediate in Zimbabwe. “The objectives of the negotiations were 
to establish conditions conducive to holding of free and fair parliamentary elections in 
Zimbabwe in 2008 and to ensure that all concerned accepted the outcomes of the elections and 
the measures to be implemented to facilitate a legitimate election”130.The negotiations made 
progress with agreement on substantive issues being made, such as amendments to electoral, 
media and security laws, a draft constitution, and issues concerning violence, sanctions, land 
and food aid. Because of the unwillingness of the ZANU-PF to relax political restrictions, the 
negotiations were deadlocked. The ZANU-PF exacerbated the situation by unilaterally declaring 
the election date. 
Electoral Laws reform 
The main amendments were the Broadcasting Services Act (BSA), Access to Information and 
Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA) and the Public Order and Security Act (POSA). These 
amendments were meant to create political space for the opposition party which had not 
enjoyed a level playing field in its participation in the previous elections in Zimbabwe. These 
amendments were in addition to other important enacted legislations of the early to mid-2000s 
that were also aimed at creating more political space.  
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AIPPA scrapped the accreditation of journalists, which removed the criminalization of practicing 
journalism without license. These changes were replaced with section 78 which lists the 
privileges of accredited journalists and section 79 which deals with the procedures for 
accreditation. The amendment to POSA meant that appeals against the banning of a march 
were no longer decided by the executive authority, but by a magistrate. There was an 
additional requirement to this amendment, the submission of detailed lists of people holding a 
march to ensure that people are charged as an individual in case of defiance and not the whole 
party as before. BSA amendments included that the Broadcasting Authority of Zimbabwe would 
in future consist of twelve members appointed by the president after consultation with the 
Minister of Information and the Committee on Standing Rules and Orders.  
 
In brief, these amendments opened the airwaves and relaxed requirements for setting up 
broadcasting houses. However, it is argued elsewhere that these changes had little, if any, 
impact on the 2008 elections. The Constitution of Zimbabwe 18th Amendment included the 
standard for measuring the legitimacy of freedoms, and arguably that would be in the national 
interest.131 The laws adopted by the government in the past resulted in the state owning most 
of the public media. 
 
There were many other institutional frameworks and provisions aimed to guard against any 
inconsistency that might arise during and after the election. The Electoral Act made provision 
for the presidential run-off in its Section 110(3) which stipulates: 
 
           “Where two or more candidates for president are nominated, and after a poll taken in  
            terms of subsection (2) no candidate receives a majority of the total number of valid  
            votes cast, a second election shall be held within twenty-one days after the previous  
            election in accordance with the Act.”132 
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Section 3(1)(a) of the second schedule to the Electoral Act  states that: 
            
           “Subject to subparagraph(2), after the number of votes received by each candidate as  
            shown in each constituency return has been added together in terms of subparagraph 
(3)  
            of paragraph 2, the Chief Elections Officer shall forthwith declare the candidate who has  
            received –(a) where there are two candidates, the greatest number of votes; to be duly  
            elected as President of the Republic of Zimbabwe with effect from the day of such  
            declaration.”133  
 
ZEC as the organizer of the elections 
Some have argued that these provisions were only applied in favour of President Mugabe and 
the same would not have been introduced had Mugabe won the March election. The Zimbabwe 
Electoral Commission was in charge of organizing the election despite receiving consistent 
criticism for being partisan and lack of autonomy. 
 
 The ZANU-PF unilaterally pronounced the 29 March 2008 as the election date without facing 
any challenge from the ‘supposedly independent electoral commission’. The ZEC remained 
accountable to the ruling ZANU-PF at the expense of the opposition. “ZEC did not challenge 
ZANU-PF upon the latter’s demand for a re-count of votes outside of the legally prescribed 
period.”134 Although ZEC is responsible for the accreditation of observers, the Ministry of 
Justice enjoyed sole authority over the accreditation. There were arguments that these 
processes, along with the Ministry of Justice’s delayed accreditation of approximately 8000 
domestic observers, were selective, discriminatory and shrouded in a cloud of secrecy.135 Its 
lack of authority over the 2008 election was also seen when the ZEC was stopped from 
releasing the results, and had the Central Intelligence Organization taking over the role of 
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guarding and managing the process, as well as the ballots, in the between-count period.136 The 
2008 elections proved the inefficiency and lack of power of the ZEC with clear evidence of 
ZANU-PF exercising control over this body. The ZANU-PF could be said to have been both a 
referee and a player during the election. The ZEC’s lack of independence was problematic in 
determining whether or not the election was free and fair. It was easily manipulated and 
controlled by the ruling party and, thus, its findings could not be said to represent the will of 
the people.          
 
It has been noted earlier that the environment prior to the election was a peaceful one. “Unlike 
in the previous elections, the campaign period was generally characterized by freedom of 
assembly, freedom of association, freedom of movement and freedom of speech, which could 
generally be exercised without undue hindrance.”137The voters were free to show which 
political party they supported without intimidation. The Electoral Commission is obligated to 
encourage the electorate to register and vote prior to the holding of an election. Although the 
ZEC had arranged registration through the use of mobile registration centers, there were 
reports arguing that it had not truly taken the task of voter registration seriously. Voter 
registration was undertaken with little transparency and was also selective.138 There were 
concerns about ghost voters. Voters who had been registered for the previous elections and 
who had subsequently died prior to the 2008 election, were not removed from the voter’s roll. 
This phenomenon is not exclusive to Zimbabwe. In many countries, voters’ rolls include voters 
who have died. The number eligible of voters did not correspond with the revised 2008 voters 
roll.  
 
The 2008 elections saw a growing number of political parties with the ZANU-PF and MDC 
remaining the key players. The major political development to be noted with both these parties 
is that they went to the election divided. However, the results showed that the splits had little 
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impact on the electorate’s choice of leadership, with both these parties still receiving the 
majority of votes. The split in the MDC took place in 2005 with disagreement on whether or not 
to contest elections for the Senate. This resulted in two factions of the MDC, namely MDC-T 
and MDC-M. On the other hand, the ZANU-PF SPLIT came over the succession of Mugabe. 
Simba Makoni announced his contestation of the presidential election on the 5th of February 
2008, causing a further split on the ZANU-PF side.139 During the campaign, the state media 
remained pro-ZANU-PF. Media coverage recorded by ZEC indicated the following: 
 
 On the television, there was a total of 240 relevant items- 157 on ZANU-PF, 80 on 
the MDC, 5 on MDC Mutambara and 8 on Makoni; 15 on government in the context 
of the elections and 8 on the ZEC; and 
 On Radio Zimbabwe’s four radio stations, there was a total of 773 news bulletin 
items, with, for example, 166 on ZANU-PF, 23 on MDC Tsvangirai; 8 on MDC 
Mutambara, 4 on ZDP and 12 on Makoni; also 14 on ZEC, 6 on government 
departments in relation to relations, 6 on civil society. ZEC noted that there were 
minor variations across the radio stations140 
 
 
In any democracy, big parties are likely to attract more media attention as opposed to smaller 
parties. This could be attributed to the fact that the party in power usually draws more 
coverage as there is greater interest by the public to find out what would happen if they were 
to lose that power. In almost all SADC countries since independence, the ruling party has held 
power with only a few displaying a regime change. As it is obvious that when you lose power 
there is a regime change. “Election day’s expressions of political choice thus contrasted with 
the unevenness of much of the pre-election period and the turmoil of the post-election 
period.”141  
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Observers and monitors 
EISA maintained that accreditation was granted to organizations and countries considered to be 
friendly to Zimbabwe. The majority of these observers were directly invited by the government, 
and yet, according to the Electoral Laws Amendment Act of 2007: 
              No individual other than a chief elections agent or election agent or polling agent, may observe any 
election, or be permitted to enter and remain at any polling station or constituency centre as an observer, unless 
such person is accredited as an observer by the Observer’s Accreditation Committee before the commencement of 
the poll. 
 
This Committee is established by the ZEC, with the function to accredit both international and 
domestic observers142. The personnel in this committee had close ties with the ruling ZANU-PF 
party, and therefore compromised its credibility as an independent body. “The main observer 
missions were the Pan African Parliament (headed by the Honorable Marwick Khumalo),  SADC 
which included the South Africa mission , COMESA, the AU (headed by the former Sierra Leone 
President, Ahmed Tejan Kabbah), China, and a range of other smaller missions.”143By all 
accounts, the process of inviting observers was very selective. SADC has always been lenient to, 
while China has been a notable ally, to Zimbabwe.  
 
In a statement issued by the Pan African Parliament, the counting took place on the day of the 
elections, just after the completion of the election.  It is however, interesting to note that the 
recount took place more than two weeks after the elections. This followed the demands by the 
ZANU-PF against the results in 23 constituencies, and this recount contradicted the provisions 
of Section 67A of the Electoral Act which gives ZEC the authority to order a re-count of votes at 
any polling station, either on its own initiative or at the request of a candidate or political party 
contesting the election, if the Commission has reason to believe that a miscount occurred that 
might affect the result. The Commission’s decision to order, or not to order, a re-count is not 
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subject to appeal.144 Because the completed results were posted outside every polling station, 
it was easy to ascertain which party had won the election even before the results were officially 
announced by the Electoral Commission. The ZEC took a month before it announced the results 
which created the perception by many that the results were tampered with. “The time of 
waiting for the results of electoral challenges and re-counts became the space for security force 
deployment to try and reverse the March result.”145   
 
The Zimbabwe’s 2008 March election was significant in that for the first time ZANU-PF was 
challenged with the MDC taking the lead. It was expected that the party which had ruled since 
independence was not just going to hand over power to the opposition on demand by the 
electorate. It had to come up with means to sustain its power, even if it meant manipulating 
the electoral laws to its advantage. This validates Kupe’s assertion that electoral democracy is 
favored as long as it sustains leaders in power, but is rejected when the result demands regime 
change. 
 
The results  
The most notable thing about the March 2008 election was the withholding of the results by 
ZEC beyond the stipulated as well as reasonable period. The announcement of the 
parliamentary results was done in a way that the winner was not clear cut. The MDC won the 
majority of the votes but failed to get fifty plus one percent as required by the Constitution. 
During this time, the diplomatic pressure was mounting from both locally and internationally 
and there were instances of pressure put on the ZEC to release the results including: 
 
 The Extra-Ordinary SADC Summit of Heads of States and Government of 12 April 
2008, convened by the late President Levy Mwanawasa of Zambia and the then SADC 
chairperson;  
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 MDC shuttle diplomacy around Africa and other destinations to build support for the 
release of the results; 
 Former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan on 19th April 2008 questioning whether 
African leaders were doing enough to help Zimbabwe resolve a rather dangerous 
situation; and 
 UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon discussing the crisis with other African leaders at 
a UN trade meeting in Ghana146 
 
SADC put more pressure on Zimbabwe in its statement following the Summit which read: 
             ‘The Summit urged the electoral authorities in Zimbabwe that verification and release of 
results are expeditiously done in accordance with due process of law. It also urged all the 
parties in the electoral process in Zimbabwe to accept the results when they are announced. By 
due process of law the Summit understood it to mean  that: (a) the verification and counting 
must be done in the presence of candidates and /or their agents, if they so wish, who must all 
sign the authenticity of such verification and counting, (b)SADC offers to send an Election 
Observer Mission who would be present throughout such verification and counting.’147 
There was clear evidence that the ZANU-PF had access to the results before they were even 
announced officially. Its appeal for a re-count was set aside by the High Court. However, the 
ZEC went ahead and overturned the MDC victory in Bikita, with the re-count showing ZANU-PF 
as a new winner.148  This act by the ZEC was both illegal and unconstitutional.  The calm and 
peaceful environment that had prelude the March election was turned into a ‘typical Zimbabwe 
story’ of violence. The post-March election was marked by violence from both the ZANU-PF and 
MDC. The demand for the re-count was viewed by many as “a diversion technique by ZANU-PF 
to buy time for the deployment of security forces around the country to launch its run-off 
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campaign.”149 It was during this period that the SADC mediators could have staged a serious 
intervention.  Instead, Mugabe was left to take Zimbabwe into further ruins. 
When the results were finally announced on the 2nd May 2008, the presidential results 
recorded that the MDC received 47.87% of the votes, ZANU-PF 43.24%, with the remainder split 
among the smaller parties. The parliamentary elections recorded that MDC received 47.62%, 
ZANU-PF 47.14%, and MDC Mutambara 4.83% of the vote, clearly indicating that MDC received 
the highest number of votes. The presidential run-off, which Mugabe contested unchallenged 
after Tsvangirai pulled out sighting violence and intimidation as unbearable, declared Mugabe 
the winner with 90.22% of the votes.150 
The run-off presidential election was held in a violent environment not at all conducive for a 
free and fair election. After the March 2008 elections, the rule of law had no place in 
Zimbabwe. These elections cannot be said to have contributed to democracy in any way in 
Zimbabwe. This is contrary to the view that was held earlier about how elections are a yardstick 
for democracy.  Given this view it puts Zimbabwe into the category of being a young and fragile 
democracy. The democratic institutions are in the hands of the ruling ZANU-PF, and while the 
electoral laws opened the space for political participation, the practice prove different as 
outlined above. Matlosa described this as the lowest definition of democracy which practices 
elections while the democratic institutions are in place. 
Conclusion 
 This chapter has discussed democracy and its practice in Zimbabwe over the last decade. It 
looked at the post 2000 elections in an attempt to establish a relationship between elections 
and democracy. The conclusion that can be drawn is that electoral democracy has not been 
successful in Zimbabwe with its elections marked by high levels of violence. The laws enacted 
have been aimed at entrenching the ruling ZANU-PF and assisted it to stay in power.  Where 
opposition challenged the ruling party, it responded by using violence and intimidation on 
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opposition leaders and their supporters. While this thesis supports the view that elections are a 
necessary step in the democratic process, elections alone do not guarantee the 
institutionalization of democracy. In Zimbabwe, elections have been manipulated by ZANU-PF 
to hold on to power. It emerges that ‘a cause for concern with Zimbabwe is that despite the 
efforts that have been made (and continues to be made) by SADC region to shift from 
authoritarian rule to multiparty rule.’151 It was noted earlier that the electoral history has been 
marked by violence. Thus, a more inclusive and more representational government is needed to 
address this political intolerance in Zimbabwe. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter Three  
Previous interventions by different bodies 
This chapter argues that the mediation process began at the right moment given that conflict 
had escalated creating stalemates to force the parties to the negotiating table.  South Africa is 
argued to have shown interest in the conflict, long before it was mandated to mediate under 
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the leadership of Mbeki. This chapter will discuss the role played by SADC in trying to rescue 
Zimbabwe. It takes into account initiatives by other organizations and individual countries. The 
role of the Commonwealth to which Zimbabwe is a member will be examined here. Under the 
theme ‘African solutions for Africa’s problem’, the role of the African Union will be discussed. 
Last but not least, the leading role played by South Africa as a neighbor, economically, culturally 
and politically tied to Zimbabwe will be examined in this chapter. 
The situation in Zimbabwe had its build up from many events in the past. It was only in 2000 
that the detrimental effects of the regime on the economy, politics and the people of 
Zimbabwe became visible to the region and to the broader international community. Prior to 
2000, Zimbabwe, like other African states, had a duty to redress the historical imbalances. 
‘Accordingly, it allocated large resources to sectors such as education, health and rural 
development’.152 It provided access to basic needs to the poor and marginalized by the previous 
system. This was applauded by many and Robert Mugabe attained more merits as the 
liberation hero.  
 The government made large investments in rural farming to subsidies farmers to produce 
adequate food and to afford to sell their surplus to generate more income. The education 
sector was also among the major focal points. The government managed to achieve quality 
education from primary to tertiary level with resounding success. The government managed to 
subsidize most consumable products to ensure their availability to the poor who could not 
afford high prices. All of these initiatives came directly from the state’s budget and led to a 
deficit later on. It was allegedly due to the above mentioned that the government started to 
miss its payments to the international financial institutions. However, the international financial 
institutions (World Bank and international monetary fund) did not come to the rescue of 
Zimbabwe, with the media stating that it was due to its defaults on payments owed to them. 
This was exacerbated by the land policy introduced by President Mugabe and the payments to 
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the war veterans who demanded their share in governance. The signs of a crumbling 
Zimbabwean economy started to show even before the 2002. The government decided to seek 
finance from both internal and international bodies to continue to finance these programs 
rather than shut them down. This came at the time when SADC was promoting development in 
the Southern Africa. It had to prove its relevance and capability as a sub-regional organization 
in promoting economic development.  
In 2001, the SADC held a Summit which was aimed at addressing the situation in Zimbabwe. 
The findings were that land redistribution largely contributed to Zimbabwe’s problems. There 
was an urgent need to find a regional solution to this issue. There was a consensus that 
Zimbabwe needed a speedy economic recovery, a legitimate land reform program and a stable 
political environment. SADC took it upon itself to bring the Zimbabwe issue to the international 
community. “It was of the view that the international community should assist the people of 
Zimbabwe to achieve these objectives by pursuing the pledges that were made in the past to 
help finance a programme of land and agrarian reform”.153 SADC made it clear that it was 
against the illegal invasions of farms and insisted on a more legal and peaceful manner of land 
transfer. These efforts were aimed at maintaining a democratic Zimbabwe that respected the 
rule of law and the independence of the judiciary and press. The Summit agreed that the 
economic and political problems faced by Zimbabwe were of a domestic nature, which required 
a united national response by all sectors of the Zimbabwean society. 
 SADC believed that it had to prevent a similar situation from recurring in other countries in the 
region. “It was subsequently decided that the first visit should be carried out by the Heads of 
State of the countries that were chosen in Blantyre to constitute the SADC delegation to 
Zimbabwe”.154 This intervention demonstrated that from an early stage that SADC showed 
interest in the Zimbabwean situation. These efforts by the SADC happened in conjunction with 
those of the commonwealth. An official at the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS) argued that “intervention should have been much earlier when patriotism was still a 
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common feeling among Zimbabweans, at the time when Mugabe was still negotiating with the 
British.”155 He argued that the timing of the intervention was not right because the economy 
was already destroyed. He added that SADC intervened because it was criticized for its failure 
to resolve its problems.156 There were calls for a firmer intervention by  
 In the previous chapter, it was mentioned that intervention constitutes an infringement of 
sovereignty. Although SADC has the power to intervene, in this instance chose dialogue as the 
most effective means of intervention. This could have been motivated by the fact that there 
was a dispute about the dispute. This body saw land as the cornerstone of the conflict for which 
Britain was equally responsible, while the Western powers blamed the conflict on the bad 
economic policies of the ZANU-PF led government. These different understandings of the 
Zimbabwe crisis made it difficult to have an effective mediation as the economic recovery also 
depended on the confidence of the western powers in Zimbabwe. 
The timing of the intervention was criticized by Ade Adefuye, who argues that SADC should not 
have ignored the voices of the minority, referring to the MDC, adding that “the body should 
have made Mugabe see the damage he was causing to the country, and this was done too 
late.”157  However, this argument is one sided, as it subscribes to the belief that MDC and its 
leader were blameless. Although Mugabe was in control, the MDC did not do much persuade 
the EU and its allies to remove the economic sanctions imposed on Zimbabwe. When a country 
is under siege, all stakeholders need to put aside their differences and work together to find a 
solution. However, this was not the case in Zimbabwe. SADC attempted to find a solution to the 
Zimbabwe crisis by engaging with both the international community to raise funds for the land 
reform program, and the Zimbabwean leaders prior to the Mbeki-led intervention.  
Following the theory of hurting stalemates, early intervention by any other body would not 
have succeeded. This is due to the fact that the MDC still believed it could attain power through 
the ballot, while ZANU-PF and Mugabe wanted to prove to Britain and its allies that they will 
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never colonize it through the MDC, which it (Zanu-PF) perceived to be pushing the British 
agenda in Zimbabwe.  
What were the constraints in dealing with Zimbabwe? 
There is a growing consensus among both political analysts and academics that, because most 
of the governments in southern Africa are still led by liberation movements, there is a tendency 
among these governments to protect one another and that they are wary of supporting the 
West over their own counterparts based on the principle of solidarity. When the land invasion 
took place in Zimbabwe, it brought fears among SADC leaders that the same situation might 
take place in their respective countries. This was due to the fact that many of these countries, 
especially South Africa and Namibia have not dealt with the land question in their respective 
countries. The liberation movements have not been able to live up to the freedom promises 
made to their people. Most importantly, they were seen as supporting Mugabe because of their 
failure to publicly oppose him. SADC governments feared that the west was targeting liberation 
movements beyond Zimbabwe. As it has been noted that most of these governments are led by 
liberation movements, this was a worrying factor for the ruling parties in SADC. “Colonialism 
might be a distant memory in the West and the world at large, but it is still widely felt in most if 
not all parts of Africa.”158 Most of Africa’s problems some analysts argue, still point back to 
colonialism. It is however unfortunate that most commentators speak of African problems as 
being created by the irresponsible governments through their bad economic and political 
decisions. Redressing political as well as economic problems created over centuries in just a few 
decades with limited budgets is practically impossible. 
Land reform 
The land question has been ignored when discussing the crisis in Zimbabwe. Commentators 
often described the conflict as an economic crisis. Edward Lahiff159 asserts that up until 1999, 
with the outbreak of farm occupations in Zimbabwe, governments in the region tended to use 
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the land question to assert their credentials in the political sphere, but were unwilling or unable 
to translate this political rhetoric into significant action in the economic sphere160. He further 
argues that the Zimbabwe issue reflected the balance of power in the region and the 
inclinations of the ruling parties, but also the importance of the land question to the mass of 
the electorate. He points out the civil war in Mozambique, the fast paced jobless growth in 
South Africa, and a general deterioration in the conditions for small-scale agriculture, tied to 
deregulation of markets and globalization as resulting from the land question in the region161. 
The urgency of translating land reform from being a political issue to an economic means to the 
masses in the region has generated support for land reform in Zimbabwe. Most leaders in the 
region identify with Mugabe on the need to give land back to the people from whom it was 
forcefully taken; they see it as genuine liberation. However, they do not necessarily agree with 
how it was executed in Zimbabwe by the ruling party.  
At the same time, many of these leaders believe that Britain also needs to take responsibility 
for the failure of land redistribution in Zimbabwe. Mbeki expresses his frustration over how 
London did not fulfill its end of the deal as agreed at Lancaster in 1979. He was pointing to the 
fact that even though in the 1979 Lancaster negotiations, land was the main issue; Britain did 
not bother to come up with a solution. Instead, it ensured that “the land dispossession carried 
out by the settler colonial "kith and kin" through the barrel of the gun had to be sustained”162. 
One can argue that South Africa was no exception as during the negotiations that led to the 
multiparty democratic elections in 1994, the introduction of the Sunset clauses, agreed to 
between the liberation movements, mainly the African National Congress and the apartheid 
government led by F.W De Klerk, protected the right to property of the very people who used 
brutality and even killed to acquire such land. More than it was a threat to the landless in South 
Africa, land reform in Zimbabwe threatened white interests both in South Africa and abroad. 
The position taken by most African leaders expressed their individual frustrations over the 
colonial states they inherited. 
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Historical ties between ANC and ZANU-PF 
African countries share a common history of colonialism by European powers. Most of these 
countries attained their independence during the 1960s. At the era of independence, 
democracy was still perceived as a foreign concept on the continent. There was a consensus 
among the leaders of the first wave of independence that African economies would function 
better under socialism. Although there are still those who are of this view, it proved to be a 
disaster. Countries in the southern region did not enjoy the same experience as the rest of the 
continent. These countries were further subjected to what was called “colonialism of a special 
type”, because it was internal colonialism by settlers who were now citizens in these respective 
countries. It is for this reason that the problems, such as the land question, became so complex 
and difficult to deal with. Zimbabwe, former Southern Rhodesia, was internally colonized by a 
settler colonial regime led by Ian Smith through a unilateral declaration of independence (UDI) 
in 1965.  
South Africa was also declared a Republic in 1910 from its colonial master, Britain. However the 
formation of the union excluded the majority of the population, mainly African and it was only 
in 1994 that the majority of the population attained their freedom. Namibia achieved its 
independence in 1988 from South Africa through a negotiation between the United States of 
America and the government in Pretoria. Mozambique was no different to the above 
mentioned countries, gaining its independence from Portugal in 1974. It became a norm to 
accommodate liberation movements during their military training to overthrow their 
oppressive governments. These were FRELIMO from Mozambique, ANC from South Africa, 
SWAPO from Namibia, ZANU –PF from Zimbabwe, and etc. Mugabe is still viewed as a 
liberation hero by his counterparts from the region. His political rhetoric that Britain is trying to 
colonize Zimbabwe once again and that he is fighting such imperialism has earned him more 
credentials from both within the SADC region and the continent. 
Defense of sovereignty 
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President Mugabe warned that interference in Zimbabwe would trigger a domino effect of 
cross-border intervention163. Recent history of conflict resolution shows that African leaders 
prefer resolving their own crises without any outside intervention, especially from the West. In 
Kenya in 2007, when conflict erupted as a result of the disputed election, the leaders of all 
parties in were reluctant to accept outside mediation as they saw it as a surrender of their 
sovereignty. Countries in Africa are more open to regional bodies being more empowered to 
address such issues and are being well received in conflicted areas, rather than international 
bodies. An intervention by the West with limited influence from Britain might have been 
accepted by the Zimbabwean government. However, international bodies that showed interest 
in the Zimbabwean crisis had Britain as one of the most influential members such as the 
Commonwealth, the UN Security Council, the G8 and the European Union However, these 
different institutions were not unanimous as to the kind of intervention required regarding 
Zimbabwe. Their response towards the Zimbabwe crisis will be examined in this chapter. 
Weak opposition  
Many regional leaders were and still are wary of the MDC as being a puppet of the British. This 
view is based on the allegation that its main source of funding comes straight from Britain. Its 
stance on land reform was not clear; hence it did not provide a better alternative to the ZANU-
PF. The split within the MDC did no better than to raise “more suspicion on its capability as an 
alternative to ZANU-PF.”164 There seemed to be a growing regional support for the Arthur 
Mutambara’s formation of the MDC.  
 
The Commonwealth response to Zimbabwe’s crisis 
The International Crisis Group observed that divisions over Zimbabwe created embarrassing 
public debates within the international organizations such as participation in a cricket 
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championship, diverted attention from serious issues.165 This led to international games that 
were played in Zimbabwe between Australia, England and Zimbabwe not being marketed and 
not televised despite the International Criminal Court (ICC) decision to not ban Zimbabwe 
cricket from participating in these games. A deep division was again seen among the 
Commonwealth troika over whether Mugabe should continue to be excluded from the 
organization, with South Africa and Nigeria pursuing the lifting of sanctions.166 When it met in 
Coolum, Australia in 2002, the Commonwealth Heads Of Governments Meeting (CHOGM) 
charged a Troika made up of the Chair of the Commonwealth, the Prime Minister of Australia, 
and the Presidents of Nigeria and South Africa, to take action on Zimbabwe, in the event that 
the Commonwealth Elections Observer Team made a negative finding about the 2002 
Zimbabwe Presidential elections. This was the full extent of the mandate given to the Troika.167   
Mbeki recalls that the then Chair of the Commonwealth, Australian Prime Minister Howard, 
insisted that the Troika should meet six months earlier than it had decided, which it did out of 
respect for his position as Chair of the Commonwealth.168The reason he stated for this urgent 
meeting was for the troika to impose additional sanctions on Zimbabwe, for which it had no 
mandate. This was opposed by South Africa and Nigeria who decided that the troika would 
meet at the end of the year as originally planned. South Africa and Nigeria engaged with 
Zimbabwe on a state level outside the Commonwealth. It was reported that the ‘South African 
and Nigerian Foreign Affairs Ministers visited Harare to meet with the government officials to 
the exclusion of the opposition and the civil society from January 20-23, 2003’169. This was 
followed by Obasanjo and Mbeki meeting in South Africa, where the former insisted on helping 
Zimbabwe out of its situation thereby avoiding an  unduly and unnecessary criticism and 
antagonistic approach to Zimbabwe.  
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Obasanjo stated that ZANU-PF would negotiate with the MDC as soon as the latter dropped its 
court case contesting the legitimacy of the March 2002 election.170 This statement read 
together with the visit by the two countries Foreign Affairs Ministers to Harare showed which 
side their governments were taking in the Zimbabwe situation. At this stage they seemed to be 
pursuing the opposition to surrender to the ruling ZANU-PF. Their impartiality was questionable 
as third party mediators in the conflict. Obasanjo later wrote to the then Commonwealth 
chairperson, John Howard of Australia to “cancel their troika meeting with the belief that 
Zimbabwe’s suspension would expire automatically, following their (Mbeki and Obasanjo) 
assessment that the rule of law had been restored, land seizures had ended, the land 
redistribution was successful, and that the Mugabe government was easing up on its press 
restrictions.”171 Howard decided to call an international press conference to express his 
disagreement with South Africa and Nigeria, and called for more sanctions to be imposed on 
Zimbabwe. According to Mbeki, “this both destroyed the Troika and put in question the 
democratic principle of decisions by majority.”172He was advised by the majority of the troika to 
get a mandate from the heads of governments of the Commonwealth, and that the troika did 
not have such mandate. He then tasked the Secretary of the Commonwealth to consult with 
the heads of governments with regard to the imposition of more sanctions on Zimbabwe. The 
Report of the Secretary found that:  
some member governments take the view that it is time to lift Zimbabwe's suspension from the councils of the 
Commonwealth when the one-year period expires on March 19 2003. Some others feel that there is no 
justification for such a step and that there is in fact reason to impose stronger measures. However, the broadly 
held view is that Heads of Government wish to review matters at CHOGM in Nigeria in December 2003 and that 
the suspension of Zimbabwe should remain in place pending discussions on the matter at CHOGM. The members 
of the Troika have now concluded that the most appropriate approach in the circumstances is for Zimbabwe's 
suspension to remain in place until. CHOGM in December 2003.”173 
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However, this report was questioned by a number of heads of governments, especially the 
usage of the phrase “broadly held view”, expressing their reservations considering that some 
heads of states were not consulted and the ones consulted were made to believe that the 
troika was pushing for additional sanctions. There were allegations that the findings of the 
Report had been tampered with, and that it did not represent the view of the majority due to 
the fact that the majority of the heads of governments did not support the continuity of the 
sanctions beyond the one year they were originally agreed to be in place. Speaking on behalf of 
the majority of the Commonwealth members, Mbeki pointed out “that the Zimbabwe 
government has never been given the possibility to respond to the report of the 
Commonwealth Observers, contrary both to the principles of natural justice and the rules of the 
Commonwealth itself.”174 He felt that South Africa and other members of the Commonwealth 
were not obliged to agree with the Report presented by the Commonwealth Observer Team 
which produced results contrary to the South African and SADC Observer Missions. His 
justification for this view was based on the fact that the South African Observer Mission 
comprised a civil society majority, which is expected to be impartial and that it dedicated more 
time than the Commonwealth Team.  
The report by the South African Observer Mission stated the following: 
"It appears that the will of the people was demonstrated to a degree reflected by the number of people who came 
out to vote and who did get an opportunity to vote. The turnout at the polls and the number of people who voted 
was second only to the first election following the liberation of Zimbabwe. This view must be seen in the context of 
the obstacles and problems that characterized the pre-election period that is described boldly and frankly in the 
body of this report. The (Observer) Mission is, therefore, of the view that the outcome of the elections represents 
the legitimate voice of the people of Zimbabwe."
175
 
 
It  further stated that when the troika met in London in 2002, it was only restricted to the 
findings of the Commonwealth Team despite the fact that there were other credible reports by 
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people who spent more time in Zimbabwe to ensure the smooth running of the elections. 
Mbeki states that the troika “had no mandate to consider the substance of this Report and 
never did. Neither did the Abuja CHOGM, though it decided to continue the suspension of 
Zimbabwe, on the untested assumption that the Commonwealth Observer Report was correct 
in its conclusion.”176He further expressed his concern about the importance of land in the 
Zimbabwe crisis and how it had been sidelined by both the Commonwealth and international 
community except for when the rights of the former owners and food shortages are at 
issue.177The Zimbabwe crisis managed to divide the Commonwealth into a Black and White 
Commonwealth; with the White component led by Britain supporting sanctions while the Black 
component opposed sanctions. This division was detrimental to the future of the organization 
in that members might find themselves supporting one another according to racial lines.  
In the aftermath of the 2002 Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in Australia, the 
(British) Guardian' correspondent, Seamus Milne, wrote: “Since Blair's ministers began openly 
to champion the cause of the white farmers who made up the backbone of the former 
Rhodesian regime - while denouncing the black leadership which defeated it as 'uncivilized' - 
British interference in Zimbabwe has been ceaseless. He went further to say, there are only two 
possible explanations for Britain's role. One is a racist concern for the privileged white minority. 
The other is that, unlike Zambia and Kenya, Mugabe is no longer playing ball with the west's 
neo-liberal agenda and talking, credibly or not, of taking over private businesses and a return to 
socialism. That cannot be tolerated and, in the new world order, the US now appears to have 
subcontracted supervision of Africa largely to the former colonial powers, Britain and 
France”.178 
Quoting Reagan in his book called “Diplomacy”, Mbeki asserts that some, within Zimbabwe and 
elsewhere in the world “treat human rights as a tool" for overthrowing the government of 
Zimbabwe and rebuilding Zimbabwe as they wish. In modern parlance, this is called regime 
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change.”179 SADC with the support of Uganda, expressed its displeasure after the Abuja 
Summit. The Report stated the following:  
“We also wish to express our displeasure and deep concern with the dismissive, intolerant and rigid 
attitude displayed by some members of the Commonwealth during the deliberations. The 
Commonwealth has always operated on the basis of consensus. We fear that this attitude is destined to 
undermine the spirit that makes the Commonwealth a unique family of nations. This development does 
not augur well for the future of the Commonwealth.”180 
Although South Africa stood out as the country that had more influence on the Zimbabwe crisis 
but continued its engagement through quiet diplomacy, the Commonwealth did not do much 
either. The body imposed sanctions on Zimbabwe and the result of those sanctions did not 
prove to be effective in resolving the crisis rather it contributed to the economic hardship 
which killed thousands. It also highlighted the divisions among its members and gave Mugabe 
more power through the support caused by the division. The organization failed to unite to 
solve the crisis in Zimbabwe. 
European Union 
The EU did try to mediate the conflict but it was rather seen as a party to the conflict due to the 
interest it had in Zimbabwe. The EU’s reaction to the crisis was strongly influenced by the 
paradigm of good governance, a prerequisite for development aid and trade privileges as it was 
agreed in the Cotonou agreement signed between the EU and the ACP countries. Thus, the 
crisis raised expectations of the European public, together with the need to stick to the rules set 
in the agreement. Zimbabwe became a test for good governance for both NEPAD and Cotonou 
agreement.181  It was allegedly after the failure of constructive dialogue in terms of Article 96 of 
the Conotou framework, followed by an attempted but abortive election observation mission in 
2002, that the EU finally imposed the “smart sanctions” on Zimbabwe. These included a travel 
ban and freeze of overseas asserts imposed on Mugabe and his cronies.182  
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However, some unexpected developments took place with France and Portugal inviting 
Mugabe to attend multilateral heads of state and government meetings in 2003. “France 
invited him to the Franco-African Summit on the 19- 22 February while Portugal invited him to 
the summit of the EU leaders and their African, Caribbean and Pacific (Cotonou Agreement) 
partners in April, in Lisbon.”183United Kingdom and Germany wanted to oppose these decisions 
by the two EU countries formally but feared that by so doing, they would refuse the renewal of 
the sanctions  on Zimbabwe and Italy and Greece were likely to join France and Portugal. 
National interest became a stumbling block for this regional organization in its approach to 
Zimbabwe. Although unity was maintained in its approach to Zimbabwe, these acts by France 
and Portugal brought some tensions in their relationship with Britain in particular. “ The EU 
Summit was postponed due to conflict of interest  between African leaders and some members 
of the EU namely,U.K, Sweden, Germany and others over Mugabe’s attendance.”184 It is worth 
noting that Britain’s leadership against Mugabe only worked to his advantage because it helped 
his propaganda that the Zimbabwe crisis was a colonialism issue.185Also that the EU’s moral 
ground to cut ties with Mugabe, deadlocked the important relations between this organization 
and the Zimbabwe. Mugabe’s anti-colonial agitation skillfully put a strain between the EU 
members and damaged EU- SADC and EU- ACP relations.186  Germany and Netherland’s support 
of Britain against Zimbabwe was expected considering that they both have an interest in South 
Africa and Namibia on a similar issue.  
United States of America 
The Bush administration supported a more tough action against Zimbabwe and was of the view 
that South Africa was a strategic country to work with. In the beginning, President George Bush 
was in support of South Africa’s quiet diplomacy with Zimbabwe because he believed it had the 
advantage of pursuing continued dialogue.  Although the US kept saying its intervention in 
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Zimbabwe was limited to the ‘smart sanctions’ imposed on president Mugabe and his allies, 
these were actually economic sanctions. Its strategy in Zimbabwe was three-fold: “to maintain 
pressure on the Mugabe regime, to strengthen democratic forces, and to provide humanitarian 
aid for those left vulnerable by poor governance”.187  By pressure on the Mugabe regime, it was 
done through the expansion of international and bilateral support of sanctions. “It sponsored 
public events that presented economic and social analyses discrediting the government’s 
excuses for its failed policies.”188 In an interview with BBC, the former deputy Secretary of state, 
Barry Lowenkron, for the first time the US publicly admitted to be working for regime change in 
Zimbabwe. The Zimbabwean government has argued that the Zimbabwean economy began to 
take its toll after the implementation of the Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act 
by the US. This claim was used as a cover for the mismanagement of the funds by the regime. 
South Africa  
Despite, and because of apparent failure of their own response to the crisis, the Western world 
increasingly turned their attention n to South Africa.189 South Africa is the closest neighbor to 
Zimbabwe and the two countries share historical, economic and cultural ties. Although, the 
West encouraged South Africa to take tough action against Zimbabwe, Mbeki chose to engage 
through quiet diplomacy. The critics of this approach argue that Mbeki failed to put his 
principles of NEPAD to test when Zimbabwe crisis erupted. The failure of this approach to yield 
quick fix to the Zimbabwe crisis, earned Mbeki major criticism and more people, from both 
within South Africa and the abroad, proposed sanctions on Zimbabwe. The Western 
governments were called upon to “massively step up pressure and to play hard ball with Mbeki 
in order to achieve a change in South Africa’s foreign policy.”190  
Speculations began about why Mbeki chose quiet diplomacy towards Zimbabwe. Some were of 
the view that he was supporting Mugabe behind closed doors because he believed in similar 
policies for South Africa in the future. This was despite his assurances to South African and to 
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the rest of the world that South Africa would not go the Zimbabwe route.  Criticism from the 
internal opposition also mounted giving Mbeki a hard time to engage with Harare through 
diplomatic means. The then leader of the Democratic Party (now the Democratic Alliance), Tony 
Leon asserted that “the ANC was really interested in reform in Zimbabwe, or in democracy or 
human rights.”191 According to Nontobeko Hlela192 “the Democratic Party of South Africa, 
especially, has exploited the Zimbabwe issue for political gain, using this issue to incite South 
African citizens and to attempt to discredit Mbeki’s government by playing on the fears of its 
white constituents.”193 The ANC has been criticized for allowing historical ties blind their 
perspective of the Zimbabwe reality. It is true that the ANC was harbored by ZANU –PF during 
its liberation struggle but it had its headquarters in Lusaka. However, recent history proves that 
“blood chains” between the respective governments are rather weak. This stems from both of 
these countries being regional rivals, and the personal ties between their leaders are 
characterized by animosity rather than friendship.194   
In order to understand South Africa’s foreign policy to Zimbabwe, one needs to go beyond the 
allegations of misinformation and silent support propagated by anti-Mbeki groups. There was 
acknowledgement of a shared history between these two southern countries earlier in this 
chapter. Martin Adelmann195 notes that the settler colony history may be similar but it differ 
substantially in time frames. He further notes that despite the end of apartheid, the former 
enemy did not become a friend. South Africa became a notable rival to Zimbabwe in terms of 
political influence and economic development.  The IMF recorded trade growth between the 
two countries, with South Africa benefiting more. “During the 1990s, the trade balance shifted 
from roughly 1:2 to almost 1:7 in South Africa’s favor. However, both countries continued to 
protect their respective industries. Already in 1992 SA decided not to renew the 1964 
preferential trade agreement, which translated into a tripling of tariffs for goods from 
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Zimbabwe. This had huge detriment to the Zimbabwean textile industry. Zimbabwe responded 
by imposing a 100% tariff in 1999. The trade war between the two countries was ended with 
the signing of the SADC Free Trade Agreement in 1999.”196 
The appearance of Nelson Mandela as the liberation hero in 1994 outshone Mugabe’s stature 
he had earned in the making of Zimbabwe in 1980. The region also welcomed South Africa 
under the leadership of Mandela with warm hands. Mbeki continued from what Mandela had 
already achieved and further pursued the ideas of regional stability through the integration of 
economies. This gave Mugabe competition on a personal level. Zimbabwe and Swaziland are 
the notable countries that experienced decline in their economies due to the rise of the new 
democratic South Africa. Zimbabwe had enjoyed destination of foreign direct investment in the 
region over the years. However, a free South Africa redirected those investments to 
Zimbabwe’s detriment. Martin recalls that the tensions between Harare and Pretoria began to 
be felt by the rest of the region. Their struggle for political dominance forced SADC to find a 
“compromise between the two powers by naming Mandela SADC chairman and Mugabe, who 
was the last chairman of the now defunct Front Line States group, chairman of the newly 
established SADC Organ on Politics, Defense and Security (OPDS).”197 A year later, at the Malawi 
SADC Summit, Mandela and Mugabe clashed over the role of OPDS and its chairman, with 
Mugabe denying responsibility to report to the SADC Summit. Mugabe saw OPDS as 
independent from SADC and that did not augur well with Mandela that he threatened to resign 
as chair if Mugabe did not changed his behavior, and finally declared the OPDS as 
illegitimate.198 
Chris Landsberg described the relations between Harare and Pretoria, by the end of Mandela’s 
term, as ‘Cold War.’199This was due to the fact that Mugabe led forces to intervene in the 
Congo war to assist the government there under the banner of SADC with authority from the 
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organization. Unlike Mbeki, Mandela publicly criticized Mugabe’s decision and stated that 
South Africa preferred a negotiated settlement. Mandela’s guts to publicly criticize Mugabe 
have been viewed as ‘a very rare occasion in African politics and an indication of the diplomatic 
rift between the two countries.’200 It is not surprising that when Mbeki came to power he 
adopted a much quiet diplomatic approach towards Harare because the relations were already 
deteriorating between the two countries. Adelmann warns against the misinterpretation of 
quiet diplomacy as new friendship or quiet support, but must rather be seen as ‘a constructive 
engagement strategy with clear aims.201  
South Africa’s approach to land reform in Zimbabwe 
When the crisis erupted between 1997 and 2000, South Africa’s policy was that of constructive 
engagement in the hope to find a solution for Zimbabwe. During this first phase of the crisis, 
the ANC through its whip Tony Yengeni stated that “South Africa’s position was that the key to 
the solution of the problems faced by Zimbabwe was a speedy resolution of the land 
question.”202 In 1998, South Africa intervened in Zimbabwe to mediate the growing tensions 
between Zimbabwe and the United Kingdom over land reform. This and other factors led to the 
conference at which the international community, including the EU, the UN and the USA, 
agreed to contribute finances to the land redistribution programme in line with the Lancaster 
House agreement. Mbeki notes that these pledges did not materialize because “the British 
government could not find a mere £9 million to buy 118 farms, which purchase had been 
agreed at the international conference. These would have been used to resettle the war 
veterans who had begun to occupy farms owned by the white "kith and kin", continuing a 
struggle for the return of the land to the indigenous majority, which had started at the end of 
the 19th century.”203 It is due to their own failures that the Western governments have 
continued to blame South Africa for not taking a much robust position towards Zimbabwe. The 
western media together with the South African media, managed to divert attention from the 
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failure to honor international agreements by the western world to African leadership’s failure 
to force Mugabe to be accountable to the African treaties to which Zimbabwe is a signatory. 
Mbeki asserts that after realizing the failure by the UK and the UN to keep their promise, South 
Africa then managed to get pledges from the international community other than the UK to 
assist in Zimbabwe. Even this ‘collapsed in the intricacies of the UN bureaucracy, although there 
were willing sellers and willing buyer and the necessary fund.204 The inevitable happened; the 
farms were taken forceful by the war veterans. Had the farms been bought as agreed, this 
could have been avoided. However, South Africa did not stop its engagement with the 
interested parties in Zimbabwe. Unlike the international community, South Africa’s interest in 
Zimbabwe has always been that of finding a solution to the crisis more than its credibility as 
Mugabe’s opponent. In Mbeki’s words, “our poverty and underdevelopment will never serve as 
reason for us to abandon our dignity as human beings, turning ourselves into grateful and 
subservient recipients of alms, happy to submit to a dismissive, intolerant and rigid attitude of 
some in our country and the rest of the world, towards what we believe and know is right, who 
are richer and more powerful than we are.”205 South Africa always avoided to be seen as a 
puppet to the West, especially, with regard to the Zimbabwe situation. Mbeki’s foreign policy 
stood on five pillars which Lansberg describes as: consolidating the African agenda, South-south 
co-operation, North-South Dialogue, Strengthening bilateral relations, and a global agenda with 
the aim of promoting global governance in the areas of political and security issues, and socio-
economic issues.206 When analyzing South Africa’s foreign policy to Zimbabwe, it is important to 
note that Mbeki’s approach has always been in line with his agenda of African Renaissance. His 
critics have maintained that he failed considerably to enforce his own agenda of African 
Renaissance 
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The previous interventions in Zimbabwe did put pressure on the government of the day to relax 
electoral laws as to allow the opposition more political space. Sanctions works as a punitive 
measure to show that the world was not supportive of the regime practices. The suspension of 
Zimbabwe from the Commonwealth further discredited Mugabe and his men in the 
international arena. The engagement of the ANC in Zimbabwe both at the party and 
government level meant that Mbeki was better placed as a mediator because he understood 
the dynamics of the conflict. Essop Pahad argues that “Mbeki, unlike others, took time to study 
the situation in Zimbabwe and his approach took that into account”207. When Mbeki was 
mandated by SADC he already knew what needed to be done in Zimbabwe.  
 
SADC appoints Mbeki 
The international community was alarmed by this act of violence, so was the rest of the African 
continent. The SADC viewed the situation and realized that both parties were responsible for 
how things had turned out in Zimbabwe. Jakaya Kikwete, the Tanzanian president who was also 
the chairperson of SADC, said “at the end of it all, our conclusion has been accusation and 
counter-accusation, confrontation and counter-confrontation is not the answer. The answer is 
dialogue. The government and the opposition have differences, and these differences are not 
such that they cannot be sorted out at the roundtable.”208 This view was also held by Thabo 
Mbeki in 2002, when stated that “the people of Zimbabwe have a common responsibility to 
ensure that theirs is a peaceful and democratic country, in which the people enjoy human rights 
and protection under the rule of law. This is an outcome we must support”209. It was against 
this backdrop that the SADC appointed the then South African president to take the initiative of 
mediating between the two parties. Mbeki was appointed under the assumption that the 
disputants in Zimbabwe had confidence in him.  
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The negotiations were aimed at discussing their differences, but most importantly “how to get 
to a situation in Zimbabwe where democratic dispensations function, how to get to free and 
fair elections taking place the following year.”210 Mbeki was going to be the point of contact but 
SADC would remain the owner of this process and it entrusted a troika to work with Mbeki who 
would be reporting to the SADC about the progress of the dialogue. Mbeki had been long 
involved in Zimbabwe through his policy widely known as quiet ‘diplomacy’. His policy towards 
Zimbabwe was that the political crisis in that country could only be solved by the political 
parties of Zimbabwe. He urged SADC and the international community to support the decision 
of the Zimbabwe once it was reached because it would be a reflection of what Zimbabweans 
want. South Africa’s intervention in Zimbabwe had long been called for by the international 
community. The Financial Times reported that “Mr. Mbeki and the SADC need to intervene in 
Zimbabwe to help the country save itself from further economic and political strife and possible 
civil war”211. It continued to blame SADC and South Africa for being responsible for the collapse 
of Zimbabwe due to their non-intervention. It therefore, urged the SADC and South Africa to 
intervene in Zimbabwe before it became failed state.  
Was Mbeki the right choice? 
The choice of Mbeki as mediator was a controversial one. He was seen as being too close to 
Mugabe due to Mugabe being the last independence president. Mark Gevisser, in Mbeki: A 
dream deferred, stated that his relationship with the Zimbabwean President is personal, and it 
is "undoubtedly" affecting the talks Mr Mbeki is chairing between Mr Mugabe's government 
and the opposition. He continued to say that although Mbeki believed Mugabe should leave, he 
was not the right person to facilitate the power transfer.   He questioned whether Mbeki would 
be as cold and as hard-nosed as he needs to be as a mediator. He then concluded that Mbeki 
would be unable to bring enough pressure to bear on Mugabe to force him to some sort of 
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resolution. The opposition doesn't have any trust in him and the government doesn't fear him 
enough to listen to his hard words.212  
This view was addressed by Watkins and Winters213 when emphasized a need for a mediator to 
poses three powers for a successful mediation namely: facilitative, bargaining and coercive. 
This, they argue helps to get parties to concede and ensure that the terms of agreement are not 
violated when the mediator has coercive power.214  Ade Adefuye, also supports the view that 
Mbeki was too close to Mugabe as he saw him as a father. He continued to say Mugabe 
enjoyed too much respect from Mbeki; as a result, Mbeki was not as objective as he should 
have been. He even suggested that a retired African nationalist such as Mandela could have 
made a better mediator, or even a non- African should have been considered.215 Contrary to 
this view, Tawana Kupe, argues that Mugabe would not have allowed a non-African to mediate 
in his country due to his non-imperialism rhetoric. He states that Mbeki held power which no 
other had because of his status as a president of one of the economic powerful and influential 
countries in Africa.216 Adefuye’s argument cannot be validated as Mbeki managed to broker the 
deal that led to the unity government. 
John Tesha, highlights the problem of appointing a sitting president to mediate, as clashing with 
his daily duties as a head of state217. This view was also shared by Graça Machel, who stated 
that mediation is an intensive process which can be time consuming. The mediator must be 
available for unexpected events. A president might not have time to do consultation with all 
stakeholders because of his duties as a statesman. Therefore, a retired president and other 
elder statesmen are the right people for this task.218 Although this might be true in some 
circumstances, it did not apply to Mbeki. He spent most of his presidency outside South Africa. 
Africa had been his main priority since he assumed office. His mediation in Zimbabwe was still 
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in line with his pursuit of African Renaissance based on economic development, regional 
integration, peace and stability and promotion of good governance. He had been involved in 
many conflict resolution initiatives in African, and Zimbabwe was just part and parcel of his 
mission. 
 However, Moeletsi Mbeki, was skeptical about his appointment. He believed he would not 
succeed to convince Mugabe to relinquish power to the opposition. "I don't expect that very 
much will come out of any mediation effort by the South African president or by anyone else 
for that matter. The reality is that Mugabe will not accept to relinquish power because he could 
be prosecuted afterwards. And there is no amount of negotiation that Mugabe will accept that 
will get him out of power."219 It is important that a mediator enjoys confidence from all parties 
to the dispute. “In theory, a potential mediator will not gain access to a conflict without the 
consent of the parties, nor will invited intermediaries be automatically involved in mediation 
without their prior consent to play such a role.”220 In this case, both parties accepted him not 
because they had confidence in him, but his appointment was a directive from the Africa Union 
and SADC. 
 
What were the objectives of the mediation? 
The above section stated that the objectives were to allow the disputants in Zimbabwe to table 
their difference in order for them to reach a political compromise. The short-term goal was to 
pave way for free and fair election, through necessary electoral laws reform. For Mbeki, the 
negotiations were aimed to assist the Zimbabweans to find a solution that would reflect the will 
of the people of Zimbabwe. He maintained this position throughout the negotiations. He was 
against an imposed solution because it would be an infringement of the Zimbabwe sovereignty.  
Negotiations begin 
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Negotiations, begun in mid-2007, managed to achieve agreement on a package of 
constitutional, electoral and other reforms at securing freedom of speech, assembly and 
expression, which were passed rapidly and unanimously by the Zimbabwean parliament in 
December 2007. Reforms included restructuring the composition of the houses of parliament 
(with the House of Assembly expanded and made wholly elective), the abolition of the 
delimitations Commission and the transfer of its functions to the Zimbabwe Electoral 
Commission (ZEC), a curtailing of the powers of the security forces and the abolition of many 
restrictions on the media, on public demonstrations.221 Negotiations continued, with the MDC 
demanding that a new constitution be adopted, the elections be delayed beyond March 2008 
and that the delimitation of constituencies and registration of voters undertaken by the ZEC be 
revisited; ZANU-PF wishes to keep to the March date so as to reduce the opportunities for the 
opposition to reorganize and campaign in the new more open political climate and to ensure 
that the preparatory work of ZEC done thus far is not subjected to public scrutiny.222 In March 
2007 the central committee of ZANU-PF resolved to harmonise elections in the country and to 
hold parliamentary elections due in 2010 concurrent with the presidential elections.223 
However, both parties agreed that the date for the elections was going to be set by both parties 
when they were satisfied that the necessary conditions were fulfilled to hold a free and free 
election. ZANU-PF violated this term by unilaterally declaring the 29 March 2008 as the 
elections date. Thus, the negotiations were deadlocked.   
Was the mediation successful? 
To begin with, the objectives were clear as stated above, the main one being the holding of a 
peaceful, free and fair election in 2008. This compared to the previous elections was the most 
successful for Zimbabwe and SADC.  The MDC was highly mobilized and ready for the elections, 
and this was evident from the outcome of the elections. This election was a turning point in the 
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Zimbabwe history where by the opposition almost overthrew the ruling ZANU- PF. This was 
despite the fact that Mugabe had called for a snap election, hoping to catch the opposition off 
guard. The ZANU-PF’s strategy back-fired when the results proved otherwise. This strategy had 
been used by the ruling party to hold an election when the opposition was still busy focusing on 
the amendment of electoral laws and the issue of violence. The mediation was successful in as 
far as the meeting of the objectives was concern, holding of a credible election. 
The problem came with the tabulation of the results, in which ZANU-PF refused to accept the 
result before it was released. In chapter one, Mbeki was classified as an embedded mediator, 
thus, his role would and did not end with the holding of elections. Contrary to this view, SADC 
failed to pressure Mugabe to release the results within a reasonable time. They allowed him to 
buy time, until a month later. The process of balloting its self was a success. Little, if any, 
violence was experienced during this period. However, election process should take into 
account the release of results as part of an ongoing process. This delay in release of the result 
had negative implications for the overall success of the mediation 
This chapter has argued that previous interventions by different actors in Zimbabwe 
contributed to the SADC mediation success. Some could be argued to have contributed 
negatively in terms of sanctions, while others contributed positively through pursuing dialogue 
between the Zimbabwe political stakeholders. It was a combination of many efforts that 
created a stalemate and ripened moments for successful mediation. The suspension of 
Zimbabwe by the Commonwealth hardened Mugabe’s stance and resulted in Zimbabwe 
terminating its membership from the organization. The EU also sent a strong signal to 
Zimbabwe leadership by imposing sanctions on Mugabe and his close allies after dialogue 
proved ineffective. The chapter interrogated the appointment of Mbeki and held that he was 
the right person for the job, despite skepticism by other influential analysts and commentators. 
The US response towards Zimbabwe promoted awareness of the bad governance and human 
rights violations perpetrated by ZANU-PF.   
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Chapter Four 
The power-sharing deal 
This chapter discusses the unfolding of the 2008 events in Zimbabwe which led to a power-
sharing deal signed by three main political parties in Zimbabwe in the presence of the SADC 
appointed mediator Thabo Mbeki. This chapter discusses the power-sharing agreement that 
was signed by the political leadership of Zimbabwe to end the political as well economic crisis 
which had crippled the country for almost a decade. It examines the manner in which SADC as 
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well as the continental mother-body (the African Union) handled the conflict in Zimbabwe. It 
argues that power politics is what informed the SADC mediation at the expense of the 
electorate and democracy in Zimbabwe. As a result, the future of democracy in this country and 
the region at large could be a fragile one. 
Following its controversial March 2008 general elections, Zimbabwe found itself in uncharted 
territory. The Movement for Democratic Change had won the general election that was held on 
the 29 March 2008, against the ruling ZANU-PF which had enjoyed power for 28 years of 
unbroken power since independence, but failed to get the necessary majority required for 
presidency. This required a run-off presidential election between the two opponents so that the 
winner could get absolute majority. Although, the 2008 elections were said to have been free 
and fair, the events that followed after the general elections were marked by violence. Despite 
this increase of violence, the ZANU-PF went ahead and pronounced a date for the presidential 
run-off election on the 29 June 2008. President Robert Mugabe contested in this election 
unopposed and pronounced himself the winner and president on Zimbabwe. The opposition 
party, the MDC pulled out from the rerun sighting violence and intimidation on its leadership 
and supporters as unbearable.  
 
The events that took place between the counting and announcing of the results were a clear 
indication that elections were not a solution to the political crisis in Zimbabwe. A different 
strategy was needed by SADC.  SADC-appointed mediator, Mbeki, was reported to have gone to 
Zimbabwe to discourage Mugabe from going ahead with the run-off election which was 
scheduled to take place in June. His effort was not taken seriously by the Harare government; 
the presidential run-off went ahead, with Mugabe contesting alone after Tsvangirai had pulled 
out sighting violence and intimidation against the MDC’s leadership and supporters as the 
reasons. Transfer of power through the ballot had proven to be inapplicable to Zimbabwe. 
SADC and the AU started to sing a different tune from what was the initial objective of the 
mediation. Mbeki was reaffirmed as the SADC mediator at the SADC Communiqué by the AU, 
UN and SADC. It was time for Mbeki to acknowledge the task given to him by the regional 
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organization and to move away from his quiet diplomacy approach. Throughout the years, 
quiet diplomacy meant persuasive engagement at a minimal level. A different approach was 
needed. His denial of crisis in Zimbabwe compromised his impartiality as a mediator since this 
view was shared with the ruling ZANU-PF.  
In his capacity as the facilitator appointed by the SADC, Mbeki had the power to denounce the 
presidential run-off election and base the power-sharing negotiations on the outcome of the 
March election. The mediator needs to possess coercive power. Mbeki did not exercise the 
power wielded to him by the three powerful organizations, SADC, UN, and AU. The view 
expressed earlier, on how African Renaissance was the driving force behind Mbeki’s approach 
towards Zimbabwe, should not be seen as a justification for failure to exercise the leverage 
South Africa enjoyed over Zimbabwe. Therefore, Zimbabwe became a test for what African 
leaders said they believed in. It was Mbeki’s dream to see SADC at least, and Africa at most, 
prosper economically and politically through his New Partnership for Africa’s Development’s 
(NEPAD) principles. Unfortunately, Mugabe, through his manipulation of solidarity of the 
African continent, took advantage of Mbeki’s dream.  
Balance of power 
It should be noted that Mbeki held delicate power on his personal capacity. He was weakened 
by the intraparty politics within the ANC back in South Africa. The Polokwane Conference 
challenged his power as an individual, when his rival Jacob Zuma defeated him at the party’s 
presidential election. The view held earlier that Mbeki’s presidential duties did not clash with 
his SADC mediation a duty is challenged here. He was now preoccupied with his internal affairs. 
Of course, Mugabe was watching the decline of Mbeki’s power and took advantage of the 
opportunity. Mugabe knew that Mbeki believed in home-grown solutions based on his famous 
‘African solutions to African problems’, hence, his non-imperialism rhetoric. The ZANU-PF 
government has been relying on Chinese aid for years now. Both Zimbabwe and South Africa 
are good trading partners to China. But between the two countries, China would go with South 
Africa had Mbeki persuaded the Chinese government to cease funding the Mugabe regime as 
his part of taking a tough stance against Mugabe and his party. This view is shallow in that 
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China does not consider human rights as a priority. It had an interest to protect and South 
Africa could not have done much to influence China. Where South Africa could, it did exert 
pressure on China. For instance, South Africa turned away a ship caring arms from China to 
Zimbabwe with the belief that they.  Again, this power was compromised by the western 
countries that kept pushing that he takes a tough action against Zimbabwe. He would be 
viewed as defying his idea of African Renaissance by taking instructions from western countries. 
He was now stuck in the middle. 
 
Talking about the negotiations 
 The negotiations took a different shape after the presidential run-off that resulted in Mugabe 
inaugurated as a president of the country. This country had been without a proper cabinet 
since the March election. Now the negotiations were aimed at achieving a power-sharing 
accord between the Zimbabwean main political parties. The MDC faction led by presidential 
candidate Morgan Tsvangirai and a smaller grouping led by Arthur Mutambara began 
preliminary discussions on Thursday, the 5th of July 2008 with officials from Mugabe's ruling 
ZANU- PF under the auspices of South African mediators in Pretoria, the South African capital. 
The pre-negotiation meeting came with many changes; Tsvangirai refused to participate in the 
Mbeki-mediated negotiation “unless the mediation mechanism is changed, no meaningful 
progress can be made toward resolving the Zimbabwe crisis.”224 These were the terms and 
conditions of the negotiations from the MDC: 
 The immediate cessation of violence and the withdrawal and disbanding of militia 
groups, paramilitary camps and illegal road blocks. All structures and infrastructure of 
violence must be disbanded. Amongst other things, war veterans, youth militia and 
others encamped on the edges of our cities, towns and villages need to be sent home 
and be reintegrated into society.  
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 The normalization of the political environment, including the release of the more than 1 
500 political prisoners, cessation of political persecution and allowing the currently 
besieged MDC leadership to conduct business and travel without hindrance  
 The reinstatement of access by humanitarian organizations to the people of Zimbabwe 
in order to provide food, medical and other critical services throughout the country.  
 Parliament and Senate must be sworn in and begin working on the people's business. 
 The mediation team is expanded to include an AU permanent envoy.225 
 
These talks were adjourned without reaching an agreement. Tsvangirai stated that the MDC’s 
pre-conditions could not be met over-night; hence, no agreement was reached by the 
negotiators226. The violence perpetrated by the government still took place and the mediation 
team was not added. But the ZANU-PF through state media said an agreement on the 
negotiations framework would be reached soon. This was aimed to put pressure on the MDC to 
reach an agreement soon because it would be viewed as not keen to reach a solution to the 
Zimbabwe crisis. A South African newspaper, “The Sunday Independent, said the negotiating 
parties would sign an agreement to guide "intensive talks" that would begin in Harare on 
Wednesday and run until the end of July. The talks would focus on the formation of an inclusive 
government.”227 On the 15th of July, The Star reported that the Zimbabwean rivals were locked 
in talks in Harare, the previous night, putting the finishing touches to a draft document 
intended to pave the way for power-sharing negotiations to begin later that week.228It was 24 
hours before the signing of the MOU and the MDC still insisted that it would not sign because it 
did not believe that its concerns would be addressed before the signing of the document. The 
MDC insisted on this position forgetting that ZANU-PF had its own game plan. It was clear that 
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the demands were not going to be met in time, and the ZANU-PF government was going to go 
ahead with the naming of the cabinet which would destroy the negotiations. The MDC actually 
had limited choice in this situation. ZANU-PF enjoyed an upper hand during this period. 
 
Was there a need for mediation? 
The first round of negotiations was about the creation of political space and peaceful 
environment for a free and fair election scheduled to take place in 2008. That was achieved and 
the elections were held but the outcome was not accepted by the parties that contested in the 
elections. As a result, the pre-election climate was now marked with violence. The second 
round of negotiations had to end the political violence which defined Zimbabwean politics. But 
the interesting question is: why did the parties agree to negotiate again? The results were 
known and the SADC and the AU could have easily enforced them, since the elections were held 
under their auspices, giving them more credibility. The late Zambian president, Levy 
Mwanawasa and the Botswana president Ian Khama supported the view that holding an 
election was going to bring a resolution in Zimbabwe. Even Tsvangirai urged Mbeki that the 
negotiations should reflects the will of the Zimbabweans as expressed in the March elections. 
He stated that “creativity, leadership and vision are essential in this delicate stage. We need a 
government that transfers power to the elected representatives of the people to carry out the 
people’s mandate for change.”229 He added that “We knew negotiations would be difficult, but 
a resolution that represents anything other than the will of the Zimbabwean people would be a 
disaster for our country. We are committed to a solution that recognizes that the people spoke 
on the 29th of March 2008 – a solution that ensures tangible deliverables are put on the table 
of Zimbabweans. A solution must thus put the people first, not leadership positions and 
titles.”230 Was this the case? Did the people of Zimbabwe become part to the power-sharing 
equation? These questions will be answered later in this paper.  
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But the answer to the ultimate question: was there a need for mediation, is a definite yes. The 
above shows how the MDC and ZANU-PF had become worlds apart, with neither of the parties 
wanting to compromise. The MDC’s stance was that any resolution should be based on the 
outcome of the March election; while ZANU-PF insisted on its recognition as a legitimate 
government of Zimbabwe. Both parties wanted to rule Zimbabwe exclusively. It was against this 
backdrop that an external body was essential to move these rivals from ‘zero-sum mentality to 
positive mentality’. This theory, advanced by Zartman231, suggests that a mediator should 
transform the conflict from all-or-nothing mentality into parties realizing the urgency of 
working together towards a common goal or solution. “The objective of the intervention is not 
to assist either party to gain outright victory over its adversaries, but to break the impasse and 
bring the parties to a level where they would be able to settle for a win-win outcome.”232 The 
recovery of the economy depended on both parties working together. But how does this 
happen in country where violence has been the order of the day, where state security organs 
have been used to perpetrate violence against citizens, and where the government has failed to 
honor every agreement made with the opposition? Trust becomes an issue. It should be borne 
in mind that these people were not negotiating for the first time; in fact, this was a 
continuation of the negotiation that was deadlocked by the ZANU-PF’s infidelity. A mediator 
was necessary to facilitate the dialogue between the parties since it required compromise. 
Adversaries feel safer to concede to a mediator than their opponent because it can be justified 
to the supporters and not be seen as a sign of surrender.  
MDC negotiated  
It became clear to the MDC that transfer of political power with a ballot was rather difficult 
given the power ZANU-PF enjoyed over the state institutions, including the Zimbabwe Electoral 
Commission. Another election was likely to result into violence if it did not sustain the ZANU-PF 
political power. Secondly, the economy was not getting any better and it was clear that foreign 
aid could only start flowing in if the MDC was in power, as the European Union (EU) kept saying. 
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All the mechanisms it had applied seemed to be ineffective, the sanctions by the international 
community only crippled the economy and Mugabe was immune to them. Thirdly, negotiating 
with the ZANU-PF did not mean that the battle was over; it was a strategic decision to influence 
the system from within.  And last but not least, the violence had become unbearable. The 
power imbalance caused by the support enjoyed by the ZANU-PF from the military and all the 
state security organs had put the MDC at the disadvantage position. But over and above, it had 
to avoid state collapse due to militarized politics and the inflation running at six digits. The MDC 
had all the necessary legitimacy but lacked power because all state institutions were aligned to 
the ZANU-PF. Without this power, the MDC could not function in Mugabe-led Zimbabwe. 
Therefore, negotiation was necessary to save the country and the people of Zimbabwe. 
ZANU-PF negotiated 
Scholars of peace diplomacy agree that ‘ripe moments’ are necessary for successful 
negotiation. This theory suggests that parties in a dispute agree to negotiate when they realize 
that a solution cannot be achieved individually, but that they need the other party for a joint 
solution.233Reality is Mugabe did not lose his power. He still holds his power even to date. The 
theory of ripe moments did not hold in Zimbabwe. Ripe moments strengthened Mugabe, as a 
result, he got a better deal from the negotiations. He came out a recognized president of 
Zimbabwe by the same forces who had been advocating for regime change in Zimbabwe. There 
were two factors that influenced Mugabe to negotiate: economy and recognition. The former is 
debatable in a sense that his regime had survived almost a decade under international sanction, 
window-dressed as ‘smart sanctions’. These may have crippled the Zimbabwean economy, but 
his was a struggle for maintenance of his power. He drew most of his power from the military 
and other state security organs. Mugabe lost an election to Tsvangirai in March 2008 as a signal 
that he was no longer popular among the people he ruled. However, his loss of popular support 
amongst the electorate should not be confused with losing absolute power. The latter and real 
reason why he agreed to negotiate was to regain recognition. Over the years, Mugabe had 
become irrelevant in international relations, and an epitome of dictatorship. Professor Kupe 
                                                          
233
 Zartman,IW, “The Negotiation process”, SAGE, London,1977, p232 
91 
 
agrees that “recognition is important for power”.234 Mugabe’s re-election was widely 
condemned within the international community, thus the need to regain that confidence. 
ZANU-PF tempered with the results of the March elections which led to the one-man 
presidential run-off, and at the end of the negotiations, the power-sharing deal depended on 
him for implementation. The power imbalance in Zimbabwe was and still is the reason why 
durable peace cannot be achieved. 
 
The signing of Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) 
This was the first positive step taken by the adversaries in Zimbabwe political crisis to end 
violence and find a peaceful resolution. The MOU set the terms and conditions on which the 
negotiations would be based and its main aim was the establishment of an inclusive 
government. The signing of the MOU epitomized the commitment the Zimbabwean parties 
were making towards the negotiation. It addressed the key concerns from all parties that 
hindered the process to finding a solution. “For ZANU-PF, the key issues relating to sanctions, 
the land question and external interference were included as agenda points. For the MDC, the 
issue of security of its members, the prevention of violence, calls for the stop of hate speech, as 
well as the role of SADC and the African Union (AU) as underwriters and guarantors of the 
global political agreement seem to have allayed their major concerns.”235 The MOU did not 
specify the kind of government that was going to be formed in the completion of the 
negotiations; it was left to the substantive negotiations. “There were calls for a government of 
national unity such as the call made by the AU at its 11th Ordinary Session in Sharm El Sheik, 
Egypt. Others, including the MDC, supported by Kenyan Prime Minister Raila Odinga, called for 
a transitional government with a limited time frame and with responsibilities such as drafting a 
new constitution, security reforms, and holding elections.”236Mugabe was for a unity 
government in order to allow himself another term in power.  This document restricted the 
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negotiations to a two-week process. The mediator was clearly over ambitious to set this 
timeframe as the political situation in Zimbabwe had turned violent. 
The signing of the MOU indicated willingness of the parties to work together under the 
facilitation of the mediator. Saadia Touval states that “when the government itself is a party to 
the conflict, acceptance of outside mediation carries a bargaining disadvantage. It implies that 
it recognizes its opponents as being equal in status, entitled to present their point of view to an 
outside body, regardless of the government’s claim to exclusive jurisdiction over the citizens 
living in its sovereign territory. Placing internal opponents of a government on an equal footing 
with the regime implies that the opponents’ claims are no less legitimate than those of the 
government.”237 As to how valid this was in Zimbabwe, it depends from which angle one 
approaches the Zimbabwe situation. One view is that, ZANU-PF led the government when going 
to the negotiations. "Legally speaking, President Mugabe was the elected leader of the country 
because he was sworn in according to the laws of the land, whether there was violence or no 
violence, Tsvangirai pulled out of an election he was supposed to contest, four days before it 
was held238.” Therefore, it was a compromise from the ZANU-PF side to agree to negotiate with 
the opposition because it was now placed on equal foot with the MDC. A contrary view will be 
that the MDC was the one that compromised its position as a legitimate government as per 
March 2008 election outcome. Hence, it was reluctant to accept the SADC mediation led by the 
former South African president. Before the second round of negotiations, the MDC had the 
legitimacy but lacked the power. Whether or not Touval’s analysis applied in Zimbabwe is a 
matter of perspective.  
The next chapter evaluates the extent to which the SADC mediation efforts were successful in 
Zimbabwe. It analyses the barriers and conditions that facilitated the negotiations and how 
these were addressed by the mediator. It reaffirms the position taken earlier on that mediation 
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is instrumental for conflict resolution. Also, it is a summary and conclusion of the main 
argument from this thesis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter FIVE 
Beyond the agreement: Implementation process 
This last chapter evaluates the global political agreement, the gains and constrains experienced 
with regards to implementing it. The global political agreement which was signed in September 
2008 by the tree main political parties, the MDC-Tsvangirai, MDC-Mutambara and ZANU-PF, led 
to a government of national unity. The agreement aimed to address the following: restoration 
of the economy and the rule of law; removal of sanctions; land question; media reform; draft 
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new Constitution; and promote national healing.  This chapter evaluates the GPA and 
recommends some guidelines for the future. 
 September 2010 marked the second year since the signing of the GPA and yet not much has 
been done with regard to its implementation. The implementation process has been stalled by 
disagreements over the allocation of cabinet ministries, with ZANU-PF appointing most key 
ministries to maintain its control over the state security. While ZANU-PF managed to secure 
National security, Defense, Foreign Affairs, Lands and Rural Resettlement, Justice and Legal 
Affairs, to name a few239, Mugabe still refuses to swear Roy Bennet as the Deputy Minister of 
agriculture even though the charges against him have been withdrawn. This has led to unequal 
distribution of power in Zimbabwe parliament. 
Violation of the GPA 
Mugabe and his party ZANU-PF have made serious infringements on the GPA since it was 
signed. Article 6 of the GPA stipulates that a Select Committee should be set up by Parliament 
within two months of the inception of the new government, which will be mandated to draft 
the new Constitution in consultation with all the stakeholders. This process has been stalled 
and no there is yet no draft of the new constitution in place. “The political rivalry within the 
inclusive government has seen attempts by parties to narrow the constitution-making process 
to serve their political interests.”240 
Sixteen months into the unity government, there are still unresolved issues with regard to 
status of the Reserve Bank governor Gideon Gono, and Attorney-General Johannes Tomana 
who are blamed for fuelling hyperinflation through printing money in order to shore up 
Mugabe’s regime, while the latter is blamed for presiding over the prosecution of human rights 
and opposition activists.241 Mugabe still maintains that there will be no discussion over these 
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posts. This amounts to another violation as the GPA states that the President, in consultation 
with the Prime minister, must choose the cabinet. He appointed them unilaterally.  
Article 20 clauses 20.1.4a and (b) state that the prime minister chairs the Council of Ministers 
and is the deputy chairperson of cabinet and also exercises executive authority. This has not 
been the case in Zimbabwe as Tsvangirai has been disallowed to demonstrate this authority; 
instead Joice Mujuru and John Nkomo (the two vice presidents) alternate with the chairing of 
the cabinet.242  Under this very same clause, the Prime Minister is supposed to oversee the 
formulation of government policies by the cabinet, and the ministers are required to report and 
are accountable to him. Mugabe violated this on January 25, 2010 when he issued a written 
order for all ministers to report to the vice-presidents and their permanent secretaries, but not 
to Tsvangirai on the execution of government business.243 Mugabe claimed all the key 
ministries, accommodated most of his allies to prevent further splits, while Tsvangirai is left to 
be a ceremonial Prime Minister. Mugabe’s intentions are not yet clear and this can have a 
detrimental impact on the economy, as the removal of sanctions will be delayed. And these 
sanctions “have proven to be counterproductive because they have left Zimbabwe in a state of 
social, economic and political collapse prior to the formation of the inclusive government.”244 
ZANU-PF heads the Land Affairs Ministry and this could mean further delay on land reform 
policies. Land is one of the key issues that continue to haunt Zimbabwe after so many years. 
Failure to address this may delay reconciliation and economic recovery. Furthermore, “a 
number of generals have reportedly built up substantial landholdings as a result of farm 
seizures meant to assist the poor”245. It is no wonder ZANU-PF is opposed to implementing the 
GPA as it requires a transparent and comprehensive land audit.246 Moreover, it will delay 
restoration of full productivity on all agricultural land which one of the stipulations of the GPA.  
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Further delays on the implementation and continued disagreements over ministries can only 
mean more political and economic instability in Zimbabwe. This has the potential to cause one 
or more signatory of the GPA to pull out of the unity government. ZANU-PF is likely to end up 
being the sole governing party in Zimbabwe should these violations continue. The GPA can be 
argued to have created two centers of power as opposed to the unity government it was meant 
to create. The unequal distribution of political power has the potential to reverse the 
achievements of the SADC mediation, which is the creation of political platform to plan and 
decide on the future of Zimbabwe. The GPA provided Zimbabweans with hope but the 
implementation and its success depends on the political leadership of Zimbabwe. 
Policy recommendations 
 The implementation of the GPA should take priority over the allocation of ministries. 
This will mean that all parties fast track the constitution process and prepare 
Zimbabwean for the next election. 
 GNU should consider shifting policies on sanctions and financial support to reflect the 
pressing need of the people of Zimbabwe rather than political personalities247 
 Both parties need to realize that none of them holds unilateral control of government 
institutions and therefore, cooperation is key to the success of the unity government.248 
 
Evaluation of the mediation 
Diplomacy in its nature is about constructive engagement through dialogue. It can be 
understood to mean “that the intervening party will not humiliate or attack in public either or 
any of the parties to the conflict and there is not moral grandstanding; that punitive measures 
are taken off the table, and are not an option; and finally, talking and dialogue are used to seek 
an agreement between the warring parties.”249 This approach was applied in Zimbabwe by both 
South Africa and SADC. The justification for this theory would be that South Africa’s liberation 
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was achieved through dialogue. Thus, dialogue has informed South Africa’s approach to conflict 
resolution. This thesis argues that persuasive dialogue was successfully applied in Zimbabwe 
and the signing of the power-sharing deal was the proof.  Many will agree that, over time, this 
policy seemed ineffective in addressing the crises in Zimbabwe, but eventually the results were 
positive. The MDC and the ZANU-PF came to terms with the fact the solution to the country’s 
problems required they partnership. The criticism of this policy might have been influenced by 
fact that South Africa did not publicly criticize Mugabe and his regime.  
Mbeki was seen as agreeing with what the government in Harare was doing. The reality is, 
“Mbeki spoke a lot on Zimbabwe, and he made it clear that he disapproved of how land was 
addressed in Zimbabwe in Mugabe’s presence.” 250 Throughout his term, Mbeki was never an 
advocate of public diplomacy, his approach to Zimbabwe was an extension of his domestic 
policy. According to Pahad, Zimbabwe and its citizens was a priority to South Africa over its 
international popularity. It became important for South Africa to resolve the crises to avoid 
Zimbabweans from flooding to South Africa.251 The one thing that Mbeki understood well was 
that criticizing Mugabe in public did not impact on Zimbabwe. Therefore, persuading him 
behind closed doors became more effective. 
 
Constraints that facilitated the negotiations 
The politics in Zimbabwe were highly militarized making violence a greater stumbling block. The 
military had made its position clear that it would not be under the leadership Tsvangirai, a 
leader with no liberation credentials. ZANU-PF enjoyed the support of the security force and 
the mediator was aware of this problem and that it would create greater instability if Tsvangirai 
became president after the government of national unity was formed. It was noted earlier that 
the mediator needs to know the barriers and conditions that facilitate negotiations, and how to 
overcome them effectively. Both the parties were committed to the negotiations but they both 
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wanted to lead the new government. A deal that did not put Mugabe as president would 
remain shaky and lead to instability caused by the security apparatus. On the other hand, 
extending Mugabe’s terms would not be reflecting the will of the majority of the Zimbabwean 
people expressed in March elections. Continued conflict would not rescue the economy. Saving 
the economy is both parties’ interest. Both parties could no longer resist the effects of the 
world’s lowest economy but who holds power set the parties apart. The MDC had to be part of 
the government since losing is not good for attracting support. 
Downside of the mediation 
The ultimate outcome of the mediation was a success in that the conflict it was meant resolved 
was resolved and the violence decreased. However, the SADC allowed Mugabe too much time 
to turn a legitimate event into irrelevant. SADC failed to intervene when they realized that 
results were not issued within a reasonable time. They failed to pressure Mugabe and his 
ZANU-PF to comply to the electoral laws of Zimbabwe. The March results, which are believed to 
have been won by the MDC, proved that ZANU-PF had lost support even from its major 
constituency. It needed plan B to regain the legitimacy by withholding the results in preparation 
of the presidential run-off it had set up. One may wonder why Mugabe insisted on holding this 
election after Tsvangirai had pulled out. The answer is quiet simple. It was essential that he 
holds an event similar to the legitimate event in order for him to be protected by the Zimbabwe 
electoral laws, even though the elections were not legitimate themselves. He wanted the wipe 
the success of the MDC in the first round elections. The Memorandum of Understanding was 
signed which set the terms and conditions for the negotiations. “The MOU, underwritten by the 
SADC, had barred Mugabe from convening Parliament or forming Cabinet while talks were 
underway and said the Zimbabwean leader could only take such action with the consent of the 
other parties to the dialogue.”252 However, when the parties reached a deadlock over who was 
going to lead the new government, Mugabe went ahead and chose cabinet without the MDC. 
He was again allowed to call the shots because there were no punitive measures taken against 
him.  
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 Many have argued that the SADC mediation was far from becoming a success due to the 
vulnerable deal it produced. It is true that the ZANU-PF did not stick to the agreement; it 
resisted relinquishing power to the MDC. The mediator was there to facilitate the deal leading 
up to the government of National Unity. The implementation and success of the deal rests with 
the parties to the deal. It would unreasonable to measure the success of the deal by looking at 
how the government duties were executed. The matters arising after the signing of the deal 
should be treated as a domestic affair, ZANU-PF and the MDC are now both members of the 
Zimbabwean cabinet and their cooperation is required to solve the problems confronting 
Zimbabwe. Success of the mediation needs to be measured against its initial objectives.    
Recommendations 
 SADC needs to send a strong a message to its member states that undermine treaties 
endorsed by this body. This will prevent parties from violation agreements without 
punishment. 
 Persuasion might have worked in Zimbabwe, but SADC needs set mechanisms that will 
prevent further election-related violence that leads to power sharing being a quick-fix in 
its intervention. 
 SADC leadership should avoid displaying weakness by not agreeing on how to handle 
regional conflict. The division caused by the Zimbabwe crisis delayed intervention and 
showed that SADC is not ready to act as a collective.    
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